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Abstract 
 
The aim of this work has been to analyze the alternatives that the euro area has with respect 
to the completion of the economic and monetary union (EMU), and more specifically with 
regards to the fiscal pillar. For the purpose to be fulfilled, a research in this topic has been 
performed so as to identify the possible solutions to the fiscal union of the euro area and 
select, among those, different approaches to the same problem. Therefore, the paper intends 
to identify pros and cons from the chosen alternatives in relation to the current context of the 
European Union (EU).  
 
With regards to the prospects of a possible fiscal union there is plenty of information and 
studies performed by economists from all around the world. Thus, one of the main challenges 
has been to select solutions from all the information available and try to come up with a 
concise and summarized paper that is able to reflect the current challenge that the EU is facing; 
as well as the diversity of feasible solutions that can be implemented.  As a result, the paper 
intends to provide with a clearer picture of the needs of the EU and the options it has. The 
alternatives for the completion of the fiscal pillar have been obtained from a variety of sources, 
ranging from institutional EU sources to specialized articles. The objective has been to offer a 
simplified explanation of each alternative in order to provide for a clear image of the solutions 
and its implications.  
 
The first chapter of the work consists on the basic concepts related to an EMU in order to 
introduce the reader with the topic that is further developed. The focus of this work is on the 
fiscal pillar of the EMU, thus, the attention is with regards to this topic.  This chapter also 
describes the legal framework of the EU with regards to fiscal rules, as well as the available 
tools the EU had, previous to the crisis of 2008, but also after the crisis, in order to coordinate 
national fiscal policies and provide for macroeconomic stabilization. This chapter was included 
in the work because it was considered necessary, before analyzing possible reforms or new 
mechanisms to be implemented, to know which is the starting point of the EU, what are the 
elements with which the EU has been able to act until the date.  
The second chapter of the work is focused on identifying some of the design failures of the EU, 
more specifically the euro area, that specially affect the completion of the fiscal pillar. This 
chapter helps to identify the main design failures, or the non foreseen vulnerabilities, the EMU 
had from the beginning that have supposed a barrier for further integration. Not only that, 
aside from being a limitation for a more integrated union, these vulnerabilities have brought 
the euro area in a deeper recession. The recognition of such divergences across the Eurozone 
countries also helps to understand the resistance towards the implementation of some of the 
alternatives to solve the fiscal pillar issue, as major convergence needs to be realized first. 
Lastly, the third chapter of the work analyzes the possible alternatives to move towards a 
more coordinated or even an integrated, fiscal policy. The research on the topic has revealed 
different manners to address this issue, more or less intervening. The work tries to reflect this 
by choosing three alternatives from less to more intervening, or from less to more integration, 
in order to show that there are several options available and feasible, and that the first steps 
to take do not require major sacrifices.  
 
CEI INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS                                                             Nº 2/2018, 25 DE MAYO DE 2018 
COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
MÁSTER EN DIPLOMACIA Y FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA INTERNACIONAL 
 5 
 
1. What is an economic and monetary union?  
 
1.1 Basic concepts 
 
A monetary union is a group of states sharing a single currency. Strictly, it means a complete 
abandonment of regional or separate national currencies and full centralization of monetary 
authority.  
The fiscal union entails fiscal federalism among its members which could be either sub national 
political units or states. It is based on a cooperative arrangement between the members of the 
fiscal union regarding the design and distribution of taxes and public expenditures.  
 
The Economic and Monetary union was born in 1992 in Europe. The EMU does not apply the 
same for all the EU member states, the 28 member states are part of the economic union, but 
only 19 of them have adopted the same currency, the euro. The implications of the EMU are 
the following: 
 Coordination of economic policy making between member states (this applies to the 
28 EU member states) 
 Coordination of fiscal policies: imposing limitations on government debt 
 An independent monetary policy run by the European Central Bank (only affecting 
Euro area member states) 
 Single rules and supervision of financial institutions (within the euro area) 
 Same currency for euro area member states 
Source: European Commission 
 
1.1.1 The EMU governance 
 
The policy orientations are set by the European Council whilst the Council of the EU is in 
charge of coordinating policymaking (of all EU member states). The Eurogroup is in charge of 
coordinating the policies that affect the Eurozone member states, whilst the European central 
bank sets the monetary policy and is the main supervisor of financial institutions of the euro 
area.  The European Commission is in charge of monitoring the performance of member states 
and their compliance with the rules set. The European Parliament formulates legislation with 
the Council. Lastly, member states have the responsibility to provide with national budgets 
that comply with the rules set by the EU and determine their own fiscal policies and structural 
policies.  
Source: European Commission 
 
Following this governance scheme member states design their own fiscal policy (following the 
rules in the treaties), taxes that are collected at a national level are used to finance the EU 
budget, through member states’ contributions. The EU budget, “the federal budget” is around 
1% of member states’ incomes (this is much smaller than for example, the size of a federal 
budget of a typical federal country). 
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The European monetary union consists thus, on independent national fiscal authorities and 
one single central bank. The problem with this system is that, the funding of common public 
goods it’s made at a EU level, but not all member states of the EU are members of the 
Eurozone. This means that decisions affecting Eurozone members, sharing the same currency, 
are taken at a EU level which may lead to sub optimal decisions. The EU budget cannot be used 
to provide financial stability for the Eurozone members for example, nor as a tool to fight 
against euro area wide shocks in a collective manner.  
 
A fiscal union serves as a mechanism to respond collectively to crisis for example. In the case 
of federations such as the US or Canada the federal government is in charge of 
macroeconomic stabilization, federal budget has the function of stabilizing both idiosyncratic 
shocks and symmetric shocks. While idiosyncratic shocks are economic shocks affecting 
specifically one state, symmetric shocks are those that affect all state countries and thus can 
be more easily addressed. In the case of the Eurozone this is not possible, macroeconomic 
stabilization remains a function of individual member states which allows them to respond to 
idiosyncratic shocks whilst the ECB is in charge of aggregate shocks. This mechanism might 
seem optimal, considering that the EU is not a federation and thus there is no federal 
government as such, or an institution with similar powers, but in reality it has not worked 
effectively. Countries sharing the same currency need to be able to respond to collective 
shocks with monetary and fiscal policy adjustments and this was not provided for the 
Eurozone when it was first established.  
 
1.1.2 EMU objectives 
 
One of the main objectives of the EMU through the ECB is to implement effective monetary 
policy for the Eurozone, its main objective is price stability. The ECB is in charge of controlling 
the supply of euro to influence interest rates and exchange rates. The ECB is also in charge of 
realizing the monetary policy for the euro area member states, whereas for the rest of EU 
member states coordination of monetary policies is encouraged to strengthen the European 
single market in order to favor trade.  
The EMU and the single currency not only bring economic stability, they also provide for a 
more effective single market, favoring the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor. 
The single currency has implications for the banking system, bank deposits of euro area 
member states should provide for the same levels of confidence because they share the same 
currency, this is why the supervision mechanisms settled for the banking system as well as 
other common tools are so important. Another important issue related to banks that needs to 
be addressed, and is important to highlight, is the tendency of banks to hold sovereign debt 
from their domestic country. This was one of the causes of the financial crisis in the EU.  
 
1.2 EMU original tools and reactions to the crisis 
 
In 1992 with the signature of the Maastricht treaty the euro was first introduced as the 
common currency for the EU. The euro was introduced as a common project for European 
countries, UE constructors had in mind a fully integrated EU and the euro was the biggest 
representation of such an integration. Five years later the Stability and Growth Pact was born, 
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with a common currency the coordination of fiscal and economic policies was crucial in order 
to enforce the rules introduced by the Maastricht treaty, limit to the government deficit of a 3 % 
and limit public debt level to a 60% of GDP. The SGP was amended by EU lawmakers, after the 
Commission took the Council to court because of the refusal of the Council to sanction France 
and Germany for not complying with the SGP rules. The amendment recognized the need of 
introducing some flexibility, individual circumstances must be better considered.  
 
So far these were the tools that the EMU had to coordinate fiscal and economic policies within 
the Euro area.  When the crisis of 2008 hit the Eurozone the EU reacted with reforms to the 
already existing tools and by creating new tools that would provide with the needed stability. 
From the EU reaction it is easily inferred that the designing of the EMU tools for managing 
coordination of economic and fiscal policies was not enough to address the crisis. 
Two years after the official start of the crisis, in 2010, the first European semester was settled, 
with the aim of integrating and organizing the monitoring and coordination of fiscal and 
economic policies and in order to organize the Commission’s policy recommendations (which 
are not binding for member states). 
In 2011 further changes are introduced, the SGP is reformed with the introduction of six new 
laws, and the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure was created because it was necessary to 
avoid that macroeconomic imbalances in one country externalize and damage the rest of its 
colleagues.  Just a year after the Four Presidents’ Report was issued, it called for the 
completion of the EMU, therefore recognizing its first design was incomplete. The focus is on 
enhancing economic governance of the EMU and establishing a banking union through the 
adoption of the Single Supervisory mechanism. The same year the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance introduces the fiscal compact. 
In 2013 a further amendment to the SGP is made, introducing the Two pack with the aim to 
harmonize the realization of national budgets. The European Commission, in 2015, launched a 
package of measures, which entailed the revision of the European Semester approach, the 
creation of national competitiveness boards and the European Fiscal Board, and other steps to 
complete the banking union. The same year the Five Presidents’ Report proposes the 
completion of the Economic union, the Financial union, the Fiscal union and the Political union. 
 
The EU has been able to implement a set of tools after the crisis that has been useful to 
prevent a deep downturn. Although this is true, the fact is that the current settings would not 
be enough, this is why in Chapter 3 of this work some alternatives would be provided in order 
to address the fact that the Eurozone does not have an effective mechanism to perform euro 
area wide fiscal stimulus. Until the moment, the reforms to the current EMU have been 
focused on coordination of fiscal policies and this is the maximum level achieved with regards 
to what could be considered a fiscal union.  
 
In the following paragraphs the current tools would be further explained in order to better 
understand which are the options of the EU in terms of fiscal policies coordination or 
centralization. 
 
1.2.1 The Stability and Growth Pact 
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The Stability and Growth pact was the first tool created to address the coordination of national 
fiscal policies. It consists of two sets of measures: the preventive arm and the corrective arm.  
Under the preventive arm countries must comply with medium term budgetary objectives 
(MTOs) or proof that they head towards the objective by adjusting budgetary positions at a 
rate of 0,5 % of GDP per years.  MTOs take into account the situation of each member state in 
order to ensure that debt levels are sustainable, it also considers the economic situation, so 
whenever there is a boom, countries would be required to do more so as to have more 
flexibility when economic conditions are worse and thus be able to slightly deviate from the 
budgetary objectives. Another rule under this arm of the SGP is the expenditure benchmark, 
this rule complements the MTOs, when a country spending increases by more of its potential 
economic growth rate it must complement it with additional revenue measures in order to 
match the spending (this rule is one of the rules introduced by the Six Pack reform in 2011). 
Moreover, Euro area countries must inform on how would they reach the MTOs in stability 
programs, these are later assessed by the European Semester and the Commission. Lastly, the 
Significant Deviation Procedure, which would be applied to a country deviation from the MTOs 
to avoid opening an Excessive Debt Procedure.  
 
Under the corrective arm, the excessive debt procedure might be activated, it can be found in 
article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty. When a member state breaches or is in risk of breaching 
the 3% of GDP deficit limit, or when it violates the debt level rule (60% level of debt/ GDP limit) 
the Excessive debt procedure is activated. It might happen that a country breaches the 
numerical limitations but because the assessment of other relevant factors the procedure is 
not activated. The Two Pack reform of the SGP in 2013 introduced more monitoring of euro 
area member states under this procedure. Member states are required to submit more 
frequent information on the corrective actions to the Commission and the Council. They are 
also required to report regularly, every 3 or 6 months so that it is easier to detect deviations 
from the corrective measures or failure to comply with the deadlines. When this risk is 
recognized, the Commission issues a recommendation to the member state to take further 
actions. Another reform introduced by these rules is that member states under this procedure 
need to draft economic partnership programs. This programs include a set of structural 
reforms that would help in order for the actions to be taken under the excessive debt 
procedure are effective and most importantly last in time. When a member state does not 
comply, it may receive revised recommendations with new timelines to address the excessive 
debt, it might also receive a sanction, usually a fine amounting to a 0,2 % of GDP. If a country 
continues to non comply, the fine would be incorporated a variable component or it would be 
imposed every year until effective action is taken. In order to impose actions, a qualified 
majority of member states is needed to reject a Commission proposal for a Council decision. 
When the excessive debt is correct in a manner that is considered appropriate, the deposits 
are returned to member states. 
 
The current SGP has introduced room for flexibility. The EU realized that setting strict fiscal 
rules alone was not realistic and did not induce to national fiscal discipline. Member states in 
an Economic and Monetary Union know that what they do generates externalities to their 
colleagues but when they implement national fiscal policy they do not consider the effects on 
the Eurozone fiscal stance or on other member states. At the same time, they might try to 
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profit from the adjustment efforts of other member states so that they do not have to follow 
very strict rules or perform unpopular reforms. The main objective of the SGP however, has 
always been to ensure that member states comply with the rules and maintain sustainable 
debt levels. Maybe this focus on deficit and debt level rules has been the weakness of this set 
of rules and the flexibility implemented has not been enough.  
 
1.2.2 The European Semester 
 
The European Semester was introduced as a response to the crisis of 2008, it was introduced 
in 2010 with the aim to coordinate economic policies throughout the EU. The goals of the 
European Semester are to ensure sound public finances (avoid excessive government debt), 
preventing excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the EU supporting, structural reforms and 
boosting investment.  
The mechanism starts in November when the Commission presents the guidelines for the 
following year. The next phase is the analysis phase, performed by the Commission in which a 
report for each member state is issued addressing economic and social policies.  During the 
months of March and April, EU countries submit national reform programmes and 
stability/convergence programmes. During May and July each member state receives tailored 
economic and budgetary policy recommendations, which are incorporated in their reform 
plans and national budgets for the following year. 
The autumn package is composed of the Annual Growth Survey, the Alert Mechanism Report, 
the Euro area recommendation, the employment guidelines and the joint employment report.  
 
All the mechanisms in the European Semester are intended to set economic and social 
priorities for the EU. Guidance is provided by the EU to member states in order to strengthen 
recovery and to improve convergence in line with the long term growth strategy Europe 2020. 
There are also alert mechanisms in order to prevent imbalances in some member states’ 
economies and to ensure that the Commission takes action in the countries more vulnerable 
to such imbalances.  
 
This is one of the instruments that was introduced in the EU after the crisis and that has 
helped EU institutions to further control fiscal policies of member states and to provide more 
stability but at the same time it has proven not to be enough, as some member states do not 
always apply effectively the economic recommendations.  
 
1.2.3 The European Financial Stability Facility 
 
The EFSF was created in 2010 as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism for euro area 
member states. The assistance was financed through the issuance of EFSF bonds and other 
debt instruments on capital markets. It does not provide financial assistance anymore since 
the European Stability mechanism was created (see 1.2.7). The EFSF however, still performs 
other functions, it receives loan repayments from beneficiary countries from the financial 
assistance of the ESM, it makes interest and principal payments to the holders of EFSF bonds, 
and it is in charge of refinancing outstanding EFSF bonds because the maturity of the loans 
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that were provided to Ireland, Portugal and Greece (from 2010 to 2012) is longer than the 
maturity of the bonds issued by the EFSF. 
The role of the EFSF is to provide for financial stability for euro area countries together with 
the ESM which is the one currently in charge for the provision of financial assistance.  
Source: European Stability Mechanism 
 
This instrument was a rapid response by the euro area member states. Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland used the EFSF in order to address their lack of liquidity due to their difficulties to access 
capital markets given the high risk premiums that had to be paid. Spain nearly required this 
financial assistance because of the same reason too. This first mechanism was a temporary 
solution because three years after the mechanism was further developed into the ESM in 
order to respond to the need of a collective safeguard system for the euro area. 
 
1.2.4 Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
 
This procedure was introduced in 2011 in order to closely follow budgetary policies of EU 
member states, in order to detect, prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances that might 
put at risk the correct functioning of the EMU. The European Commission identifies under this 
procedure the countries that may represent a disequilibrium for the EMU and in the base of 
that realizes an exhaustive exam. The examination of the member states in question considers 
all the necessary indicators to perform a good assessment of the countries’ situation. 
 
This mechanism pretends to avoid situations such as the one with Greece for example. From 
past experience, like Greece joining the euro without complying with the necessary requisites, 
the EU is aware of the need to harmonize macroeconomic measurement, use harmonized 
methodologies and improve the data quality. This procedure, in the absence of a common 
Statistical tool for the Eurozone, intends to overcome this barrier and recognize ex ante 
macroeconomic indicators signaling an unsustainable situation or a possible future downturn. 
 
1.2.5 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU 
 
The Treaty was established in 2012 with the aim of completing the economic pillar of the EMU. 
The set of rules that the treaty includes intend to foster budgetary discipline through the fiscal 
compact and to improve he coordination of economic policies and the governance of the Euro 
area. The fiscal compact introduced a mandatory balanced budget rule, member states part of 
the treaty committed themselves to introduce into their legislation a fiscal rule for which the 
government budget should be balanced or in surplus (balanced budget if it complies with the 
MTOs). It states that countries which are not close to the MTOs should take actions towards 
convergence under a time frame previously set by the Commission. Deviations from the MTOs 
are allowed under exceptional circumstances. The fiscal rules must be transposed into national 
law. The fiscal compact strengthens the excessive debt procedure; it increases the 
automaticity of the procedure by member states committing to support Commissions’ 
proposals to the Council for breaches of deficit limits. It also establishes the benchmark for 
government debt reduction at the same level as the SGP, 60% of GDP. Lastly, it asks member 
states to report ex ante on their public debt issuance plans.  
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The Fiscal compact was introduced to strengthen fiscal discipline in the euro area, by 
committing to include the rules in internal legislation, member states are binding themselves 
to this rules. Again, this mechanism is an ex ante preventive measure to avoid unsustainable 
debt levels, and to provide the EU with tools to recognize a possible failure in a faster manner. 
But it does not introduce any new tool to perform any collective fiscal action or to strengthen 
fiscal policies coordination.  
 
1.2.6 Commission package of measures (2015) 
 
In 2015 the European Commission decided to implement a package of measures to start taking 
steps to implement stage 1 of the Five Presidents’ Report. The commission proposed the 
creation of National competitiveness boards which would be in charge of controlling the 
performance and policies of member states with regards to competitiveness. Also the creation 
of the European fiscal board, an independent entity that would have an advisory function, it 
would evaluate the implementation of the EU fiscal framework, advise on the appropriate 
fiscal stance of the whole euro area, cooperate with national fiscal councils of member states 
and provide ad hoc advice on request of the President. The board would be composed by 
independent experts. 
 
From the one hand the establishment of the competitiveness boards was another preventive 
mechanism to allow the EU to have a mechanism of preventive action, by recognizing the 
situation of each state and addressing deviations before they become unsustainable. From the 
other hand, the establishment of a European Fiscal Board is the first tool the EU has to 
strengthen coordination among member states, it is also a major step towards more 
integration because is the only tool that considers a collective fiscal stance of the whole euro 
area. 
 
1.2.7 European Stability Mechanism 
 
This mechanism operates since 2012 for the euro area. The ESM provides for financial 
assistance with the aim of achieving financial stability. The ESM raises funds issuing capital 
market instruments and engaging in money market transactions, has a diversified funding 
strategy, issuing bills, bonds or other funding instruments with maturities up to 45 years. The 
funds raised are pooled, so that they are not attributed to any particular country. So the 
financing of the ESM does not come from taxes of Eurozone citizens. Its maximum lending 
capacity is of 500 billion euros.  
The ESM can either provide loans to member states experiencing financial distress, purchase 
bonds of an ESM member state in primary and secondary debt markets, it can provide for 
precautionary financial assistance through a credit line (the Precautionary Conditioned Credit 
Line and the Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), it can provide loans to euro member states to 
recapitalize financial institutions or recapitalize financial institutions directly under some 
conditions. When financial assistance of any form is provided the member state receiving it 
has to implement policy conditions that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding 
(made by the European Commission, the ECB, the IMF and the Member state in question). 
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Financial assistance to member states is provided at a lower cost than in the financial markets, 
when a country beneficiates from the assistance it only pays the cost of funding of the ESM 
(the issue of bonds and bills) plus small fees in order to cover operational costs, and a margin 
reflecting the risk profile of financial assistance instruments.  
A part of the ESM capital, the paid in capital, cannot be used to provide financial assistance, it 
is used to invest in high quality assets, and support the creditworthiness of the ESM as an 
issuer (this is important because it allows the ESM to borrow at a low price and thus financial 
assistance provided to member states is provided at a low cost too). 
The ESM is governed by the Euro area finance ministers (the Euro group) and each of them 
appoints one director.  
Source: European stability mechanism 
 
This mechanism has been useful during the crisis and after for euro area countries that loss 
access to market because of the high cost of borrowing they had to face. After the crisis 
countries like Greece or Spain experienced a substantial increase in their risk premium 
because financial markets feared that they were going to default because of high levels of 
accumulated debt that were seen as unsustainable, to compensate for the risk of buying 
Spanish government bonds, financial markets asked for higher returns. This in turn aggravated 
the situation of Spain because their indebtedness increased even more endangering the 
financial sustainability of the country. In situations like that, the ESM is a useful tool because it 
allows member states to borrow at a lower cost than the one being demanded in financial 
markets. In the case of Spain, the ESM was used to recapitalize banks, with a disbursement of 
41,3 billion euros, the loan from the ESM served to cope with the liquidity problems that banks 
had in Spain in 2012.  
The problem with this tool is that its mandate is to act when there are liquidity problems but 
not in solvency crisis (as it would undermine the strength of the tool and affect its 
creditworthiness), and it is not always so easy to differentiate. Another, drawback is that the 
financial assistance is not provided straightforward, it requires unanimity by the board of 
governors, in some cases, there are countries that have to approve the provision of financial 
assistance in their national parliaments, this causes the mechanism to be slow.  
 
 
1.3 Completing the EMU: The Five Presidents’ Report and the Reflection 
paper on the deepening of the economic and monetary union 
 
1.3.1 The Five Presidents’ Report 
 
Since the first effects of the crisis became evident the EU realized of the need of completing 
the EMU. For this reason, several papers were issued by EU institutions and EU governors to 
establish the guidelines for the future of the EU, a more integrated monetary and economic 
union.  
The Five Presidents’ Report was launched in 2015, by the presidents of the EU institutions, it 
stated that progress must happen because the EMU was not complete and it could not 
continue lacking from a real economic union (essential for the correct functioning of the 
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monetary union), a financial union that increased the risk sharing with the private sector, 
moving towards a fiscal union and lastly a political union to provide with legitimacy. The report 
stated that it was necessary to move from a system of rules and guidelines for national policies 
towards a sovereignty sharing system. It also established the steps to follow in order to initiate 
the process and orientation for long term reforms.  
The four unions reinforce each other and allow for the completion of the EMU. The report 
divided the process of completion in two stages: 
 First stage from July 2015 to June 2017: with regards to the fiscal union, which is the 
matter of study of this work, the report established the creation of a new advisory 
European Fiscal Board. The Board was created in 2015 by the Commission, the report 
proposed that the EFB would provide at a European level for public and independent 
assessment of national budgets and their execution. It would assess if national 
governments are complying with the objectives and recommendations set by the fiscal 
framework of the EU. The EFB would lead to better compliance with the fiscal rules, a 
more informed public debate and a stronger coordination of national fiscal policies. 
The advice of the EFB would support the Commission’s decision in the context of the 
European Semester.  It is also important to highlight from this first stage, for the 
purpose of this work, that it also called with regards to the economic union to increase 
convergence with regards to employment and social performance, and with the euro 
area system of competitiveness authorities (also established in the package of 
measures of the Commission in 2015).  
 Second stage, starting from 2017 and to be finished before 2025: includes the 
formalization of the convergence process, make it more binding. With regards to the 
fiscal union, it called for the creation of a macroeconomic stabilization function for the 
euro area. In order to access such a system, it would be required convergence towards 
similarly resilient national economic structures. With regards to institutional 
strengthening it established that the ESM should be integrated in the EU law 
framework, and the set up of a euro area treasury.  
 
The presidents of EU institutions would be in charge of following the progression in each of the 
steps, and in 2017, the Commission would help with the transition to one step to another by 
issuing the White Paper. The report put emphasis on the fact that the process of completion of 
the EMU should begin without delay, recognizing the need of strengthening the EMU now in 
order to be able to be a strong economy and address future crises without being deeply hit.  
 
Going deeply into the fiscal union steps the report stated that fiscal policies are essential for 
the monetary union. National fiscal policies can affect price stability and financial stability of 
the euro area and can generate contagion effects. National fiscal policies have to, from the one 
hand, maintain sustainable levels of public debt and, from the other hand, ensure that there 
are automatic stabilizers that would address a country specific shock. The sum of all national 
fiscal policies represent the fiscal stance of the euro area, it is important that the fiscal stance 
is the appropriate to avoid pro cyclical fiscal policies. National fiscal stabilizers were not 
enough in the recent crisis to achieve economic stabilization; this is why in the long term the 
Eurozone should have a fiscal stabilization function. This would require as a pre step more 
economic convergence and further pooling of decision making on national budgets. The report 
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established that the design of such a stabilization function required expert in depth research 
during stage one of the process and also the guiding principles for such an instrument:  
 It should not lead to permanent transfers between member states, or transfers in one 
direction, and not be regarded as an equalization of incomes between member states. 
 It should not undermine incentives to perform sustainable fiscal policies at a national 
level or the incentives to perform structural reforms were needed in order to foster 
economic convergence. 
 It should be created so as to be consistent with the EU fiscal framework. 
  It should not be an instrument for crisis management, the ESM already does that. The 
role of a European stabilization function should be to strengthen the economic 
resilience of the EMU and of euro area countries.  
 
From my point of view, the Five Presidents’ Report is not a vague document, on the contrary, it 
recognizes the needs of the EMU, establishes what does it need to be completed and even a 
timeline to do so. The fact that it also emphasizes the need of rapid action and the need of 
convergence (as a process that should start now) shows that the EU institutions are aware of 
the weaknesses of the current union and of the fact that it cannot afford to address a future 
crisis with the current setting. It is also true that it calls for a political union, that I regard as far 
from the present, but it is true that the creation of a fiscal stabilization capacity would not be 
possible if convergence is not first achieved.   
 
1.3.2 White paper on the future of Europe 
 
The European Commission launched in March 2017 the White Paper that the Five Presidents’ 
Report established that would serve as a transition from stage 1 to stage 2 of the process of 
completion of the EMU. 
This document includes general information of the EU, of the EU position in the world and 
what the creation of the EU and the EMU meant in the first place, emphasizing solidarity 
among member states and the creation of a democratic and strong economic union able to 
compete with the great nations in the world.  
It presents five possible scenarios in which the EU could find itself in 2025 depending on EU 
jointly choices. The main objective of this paper was thus to generate debate and open 
discussion throughout the EU.  
In the first scenario the EU would not implement major reforms but it would collectively make 
progress, by making joint decisions in all the current areas in which the EU has sovereignty. In 
this context the EU would try to make efforts to make progress on the single market, the 
functioning of the monetary union and ensuring stability of public finances.   
The second scenario considers the possibility of the EU focused only in the single market. This 
would reduce the collective action of the EU, and it might put at risk the single currency. 
The third scenario considers the possibility of countries coordinating on specific issues 
depending on their interests. Some would be coordinated with regards to taxation, others with 
regards to justice or to defense, in order to allow further progress in those areas they are 
interested in. 
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The fourth scenario would be that the EU decides to focus in a number of areas given the 
available resources. In this areas actions would be taken more rapidly and effectively. But 
some other areas will no longer be under the EU agenda. 
The last scenario envisaged is that member states decide to share more power, more 
resources and more decision making. So cooperation will go further in every domain.  
 
This paper intended to open a debate on what should the choices of the EU be. It emphasizes 
on the efforts that have already been made since the EU started as a much simpler project 
than it is today. It emphasizes solidarity between member states and the uniqueness of the EU 
project.  
I believe that one major problem of the EU after the crisis has been the raise of Euroscepticism. 
Coping with it is important because it puts in danger the progress that the EU could make 
towards a more resilient EMU. This paper tries to highlight the advantages that the EU bring to 
citizens across the whole area, even to those that are only part of the Schengen area, to call 
for the European identity that seems to have blurred during the past years. 
 
1.3.3 Reflection paper on the deepening of the economic and monetary 
union 
 
The reflection paper was launched by the Commission in May 2017. It is part of the debate the 
Commission wanted to initiate after the launch of the White Paper.  
With regards to the fiscal pillar it establishes that there is lack of economic and social 
convergence, which would be necessary to adopt measures more effectively. It proposes that 
the member states agree on a common approach with regards to convergence, it suggests that 
they could strengthen the elements already available such as the coordination of economic 
policies (the coordination should be still established through the European Semester, and it 
should be reinforced in order to be a tool towards convergence) and the use of financing tools 
and the enhancement of the macroeconomic stabilization capacity for the euro. The EU single 
market can also be used to deepen in its advantages and foster convergence.  
It also makes reference to the conditions for the creation of a Fiscal stabilization function 
proposed by the Five Presidents’ Report. According to the reflection paper the Commission 
would study the options for the creation of such a function and would incentivize its debate 
and implementation, with a deadline set for the 2025. 
The options included for the stabilization function are the following: 
 a European regime for the protection of investments: when a country finds itself in a 
situation of recession public investments decrease, with this mechanism the 
investments would be protected. Investment projects affect growth, employment and 
productivity so if these are protected the crisis could be addressed at a faster pace. 
 Unemployment insurance scheme: it would be a re insurance of the national 
unemployment regimes.  This would support national budgets in times of recession 
and it would support a more rapid recover from the crisis. But previously it would 
require labor market convergence.  
 A European fund for exceptional situations: it would accumulate funds regularly that 
would be applied discretionally for a addressing a severe situation. The payments 
would be strictly limited to the accumulated contributions so in case of a severe shock 
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the funds might be too small. If the fund were to be able to borrow, this limitation 
could be overcome. If this were the case, the design would establish periods of clear 
saving in certain moments and a limitation of its indebtedness capacity. 
 A Eurozone budget: it would cover stabilization but also convergence functions, it 
would require a stable flow of capital. It could be a long term objective, taking into 
account the relation with the EU budget, if the number of euro area participants 
increases.  
 
Some of the options considered in the reflection paper would be further develop later in this 
work. With this document the Commission states clear that the way to move forward is to 
establish a common mechanism for macroeconomic stabilization, it does not develop further a 
coordination of fiscal policies alone because it considers it would not be enough in the long run 
to make the EMU resilient to shocks.  
 
Why is it important to highlight this papers? 
The EU has already considered which would be the best solution for the completion of the 
fiscal union in the context of the EMU. The problem it encounters is that the EU is not 
prepared to implement the proposed mechanism of fiscal stabilization. In the reflection paper 
of the Commission some of the options are defined, some of them have been already debated, 
but again, they cannot be implemented without previous steps. The previous steps require 
more unity, and unity comes with political will. After the crisis the political will towards more 
EU convergence seems to be more vulnerable than ever before, member states have realized 
that they have structural differences that are difficult to address but they have also realized 
that they need each other in order to make the euro a strong currency and the whole EU a 
strong economy. 
 
2. Roots of the Eurozone crisis 
 
This chapter will examine how the initial vulnerabilities of the EU and its institutional system 
have proved to be one of the causes to a deeper crisis and a harder recovery across the EU and 
more specifically across the Eurozone. The aspects related to the banking sector and the need 
of financial integration would not be a matter to consider in this work, as the focus is on the 
fiscal weaknesses that make the EMU ineffective.  
It is true that EU institutions responded to the crisis but the response has to be considered as a 
way of buying time in order to implement reforms with a durable effect.  
Before the crisis hit the euro area there already existed divergences both macroeconomic and 
competitiveness that were ignored, they were not considered relevant for the purpose of a 
monetary union. It was thought that macroeconomic imbalances within a member state would 
be automatically corrected and would not affect the whole Eurozone, whilst in fact, the crisis 
shown that macroeconomic imbalances of a member state in a monetary union cause negative 
externalities on the rest. Which implies that only fiscal surveillance is not enough and a strong 
coordination mechanism at a supranational level is needed to control macroeconomic 
imbalances in a monetary union.  
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The crisis also revealed that the fiscal rules established in the Stability and Growth Pact do not 
ensure that national authorities pursue sound fiscal policies, in fact, the contrary was revealed, 
member states did not take into account the negative externalities that their national fiscal 
policies would have on the monetary union. When the crisis hit member states, they faced a 
period of recession, in that context they had to perform restrictive fiscal policies, this means 
pro cyclical fiscal policies. When a pro cyclical fiscal policy is performed, it implies that the 
policy enlarges the effects of the economic cycle, when there is a recession it aggravates it and 
when there is a boom it enlarges it. To avoid a deeper crisis, the Eurozone lacks of a 
mechanism to manage aggregate demand and provide counter cyclical fiscal policies in order 
to recover faster from a recession period. Monetary policy, performed by the ECB, is the only 
instrument that can be used to perform policies at a Eurozone level, but it the current context 
of zero bound on interest rates, the effects of the monetary policy were insufficient. Which 
aggravates the fact of not having any tool to perform a coordinated fiscal expansion.  
Another weakness identified after the crisis is the lack of a euro area mechanism that is able to 
provide financial support. It does not exist in the context of a monetary union a proper 
mechanism of risk sharing, there was no automatic stabilization mechanism that helped the 
Eurozone cope with the crisis. The euro area was not able either to prevent any contagion 
effect, in an integrated market with a common currency, the risk of contagion should have 
been foreseen and the proper tools should have been set in order to prevent the effects of 
negative externalities from member states to the rest of the euro area participants.  
The financial sector played a major role in the crisis, it has become too big, which implies that 
member states are not able to deal with it with the resources they have. One of the causes of 
the crisis was the bank-sovereign loop (which means that banks were holding in their asset 
side of the balance sheet an important proportion of sovereign debt of their national country) 
in a situation of crisis, this fact aggravates the consequences, if there is currency risk (even in a 
monetary union can happen, it happened in Greece) there is no instrument for a member state 
to act and avoid the deposit runs because it can not control monetary policy. If a country had 
an important accumulation of debt it was exposed to debt runs, because with high levels of 
accumulated debt and a context of crisis sovereigns suffered a loss of access to the capital 
markets due to market expectations that raised the risk premium they had to pay, which in 
turn would imply the activation of the bank-sovereign loop. Thus, a liquidity crisis could lead 
easily to an insolvency crisis for both the sovereign and the banks. This implies that the 
Eurozone did not have any tool that provided common fiscal resources to address systemic 
banking crisis or sovereign debt runs (Tabellini, 2015). 
In fact, it has been already recognized by EU institutions and national authorities that the 
economic and monetary union was not complete. Because of that, it was not able to address 
the crisis successfully, and even in some cases it was aggravated.  
(Peret Praet, 2013). 
 
2.1 Divergences in the Eurozone 
 
When the EMU was implemented a process of convergence among euro area member states 
started, this process was stopped when the crisis hit the EU and has not been re activated.  
The objective of convergence was established in the Maastricht Treaty, in article 2 which 
defines the convergence of economic performance as a task of the EU. The founders of the 
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EMU thought that if exchange rate risk was eliminated through the introduction of a common 
currency and the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor were allowed, the cross 
border resource allocation would help to incentivize economic growth and would lead to 
income levels convergence.  
However, the current situation is not the same as the one before the introduction of the 
common currency, the differences among member states are now greater and also the 
attitude towards more integration has changed, specially in the northern countries of the EU 
that do not believe that the countries in the south would be able to or willing to implement 
strict policies to move towards convergence.  
In the following sub sections, it would be analyzed how the divergences across the euro area 
have aggravated the crisis and are the roots of an uncomplete EMU. It is important to 
understand these divergences for the purpose of choosing what should be the next steps for 
the EU with regards to the completion of the economic and monetary union. 
The main argument that support the fact that the EMU was created on the grounds of a poorly 
designed union is that the EMU is not an optimal currency area. When member states sharing 
the same currency are in divergent situations, one is facing a boom the other is facing a 
recession, which leads to different account balances, members of an optimal currency area 
would perform structural reforms to make their labor and product markets more flexible. The 
fact that there has not been business cycle convergence after the introduction of the euro 
implies that the established framework of rules by the EU has failed in accomplishing the 
objective and also that in such scenario, having one single monetary policy would only 
potentiate recessions and booms. If flexibility was introduced, in order to attain business cycle 
convergence, the asymmetric shocks would be more easily addressed and the EMU would be a 
proper optimal currency area. The problem is that making labor markets more flexible implies 
performing unpopular reforms which implies that citizens would choose the party that 
promises not to perform that adjustments. The result is that real GDP growth in the Eurozone 
has been lower than in the rest of the EU or even than in the US and the unemployment rate 
has been higher. So the EMU has failed to provide the promised economic growth and high 
employment rates.  
 
Figure 1: Quarterly growth rates in core and periphery countries of the euro area 
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Source: Jacques Delors Institut, 2016 
 
The figure above is an example of the divergences of the business cycle across the euro area. 
And how it can be divided in core (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxemburg and 
Netherlands) and periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). At the beginning of the 
euro the core countries had lower growth rates than the periphery, at mid 2000s, there was a 
slight synchronization, but then again, the divergence dominated the panorama (Brinke, 
Enderlein and Haas, 2016). 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Labor market 
 
During the first years after the introduction of the euro it could be identified a convergence 
process among euro area unemployment rate until the crisis period that the process of 
convergence stopped. The consequence could be the differences in the unit labor costs and 
salaries that have caused a different evolution in competitiveness measures and have affected 
unemployment rates since 2007. At an aggregate level, the unemployment rate had increased 
four percentage points in 2012 compared to 2008, but looking individually at each country 
there are very significant differences in the unemployment rates. Although currently the 
differences are not as significant as in 2012 it is still the case that the range of unemployment 
rates is around 15 or 20 percentage points. The explanation for these differences are related 
to the fact that there is low labor mobility inside the euro area and it does not exist a fiscal 
union that allows for risk sharing (Estrada, Galí, López-Salido, 2012). 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment rates Eurozone, August 2012 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
If we compare the euro area with a proper optimal currency area like the US, we can see that 
the dispersion of unemployment rates among the states is not as high as in the EU, as Figure 3 
shows. This is because the US has the needed mechanisms to face the unbalances that may 
occur. The divergences across euro area member states are related to the fact that they lost 
control of monetary policy, which means that a country cannot devaluate, which is useful in 
order to confront asymmetric shocks. Euro area participants lost the control of monetary 
policy when euro was implemented, control was given to the ECB, which is in charge of 
controlling price stability above all, but no mechanism was established that could substitute a 
devaluation. If the EMU were a real optimal currency area labor mobility would allow to 
produce greater convergence because labor would flow from countries facing difficult 
situations to ones experiencing less distress, but this is not the case for the euro area. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Dispersion in the unemployment rates within euro area countries and US (2012) 
 
 
Source: https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2012/arc/pdf/ELS.pdf 
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The divergences in unemployment rates are relevant to this work because they are related to 
the differences in the institutional framework of the labor market across the Eurozone. As said 
before the optimal solution would be to introduce more flexibility into labor markets, although 
that is politically very difficult. Moreover, as it would be further explained in section 3, there 
are significant structural differences in labor markets across the euro area and this have to be 
addressed before implementing any risk sharing or stabilization mechanism. 
 
2.1.2 Divergences in economic performance 
 
After the global crisis countries in the EU have experienced productivity losses, but not only 
that, the productivity differentials have been relevant in the euro area. They are not new to 
the crisis but after the crisis they have become more evident. 
Labor productivity within the Eurozone has not converged, in fact it has been permanently 
divergent throughout the years and they are present at the sectoral level.  The gaps are not as 
big in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector but still they are constant.  
 
Figure 4: Labor productivity in the Euro area (Real GDP per hours worked) 
 
Source: IMF (2017) 
 
Differences in productivity result in differences of the level of real income (which was one of 
the objectives set by the Maastricht treaty for the creation of the EMU).  
 
Competitiveness 
 
Another issue that affects the overall Eurozone performance is that inflation rates are different 
across the euro area and this can provoke differences in competitiveness and economic 
growth. The problem is that when euro area countries adopted the euro they gave up national 
monetary policy, so in the case they face a situation of domestic inflation or loss of 
competitiveness they cannot longer use monetary policy to restore their position.  One of the 
main indicators of competitiveness is the unit labor costs. 
Unit labor costs increased when the euro was introduced at different rates across the EU. 
Whilst in some countries the ULC increased at a consistent pace (mostly in periphery countries) 
in others they decreased or stayed the same (core countries). Unit labor costs vary depending 
on the wage growth and on the productivity growth. If ULC increase it can be explained either 
CEI INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS                                                             Nº 2/2018, 25 DE MAYO DE 2018 
COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
MÁSTER EN DIPLOMACIA Y FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA INTERNACIONAL 
 22 
by a wage growth or by a low productivity growth. In fact, the largest part of the differences 
between ULC growth in the euro area are explained by the compensation per employee or by 
modest productivity gains (most of them are related to employee’s compensations) (see Figure 
5). 
 
Figure 5: Growth of compensation per employee and growth of productivity (1999-2011, 
period after the euro was introduced) 
 
 
Souce: https://voxeu.org/article/problems-eurozone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Persistent ULC developments in the euro area (period before the crisis) 
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Source: ECB 
 
Another observation from the decade after the introduction of the euro is that looking into 
sectors, the industrial sector (tradable products) cumulated a lower ULC growth than the 
service sector, whilst the growth in compensation per employee has been similar for the 
industrial and the service sector. So the growth in ULC in the service sector may have been 
related to low productivity, which may lead to conclude that the service sector was less 
exposed to international competition than the industrial sector (ECB, 2007). 
The loss of competitiveness affected the current account position of member states, in fact, 
those that faced a loss of competitiveness because of the growth of ULC were the ones that 
had current accounts deficit.  
The European Commission estimated that the southern intra Eurozone real exchange rate may 
have appreciated by a 25% relative to the north, because of the above mentioned growth of 
ULC in the southern countries. The way to close the gap is through an important decrease of 
wages in the south of Europe, by an internal devaluation, but in the current context of fiscal 
strictness and low growth it is difficult to implement. It would imply that in a country like Spain 
with high unemployment rate wages would have to be cut for years, demand would be 
weaken and inequality would increase (Brinke, Enderlein and Haas, 2016). 
The result is that in some countries since 2000 there have been persistent current account 
deficits (like in Spain) whilst in others there have been current account surpluses since 2000 
(like Germany), with no tool to readdress the situation and realize transfers from north to 
south, that would be the case of a proper fiscal union. After the introduction of the euro, the 
countries that faced the lowest price levels at the beginning faced a rise of the inflation rate 
due to the process of convergence that lead to an increase of the unitary labor costs, countries 
with deficit accounts faced rises of the costs whilst surplus countries had stable unitary labor 
costs (IMF, 2017). 
Thus, divergences in competitiveness increased after the introduction of the euro because of 
the price convergence effects, and when the crisis hit the euro area these divergences were 
already in place, which means that they aggravated even more the recession. The ECB as an 
independent institution and a mandate focused on price stability was not able to address the 
asymmetries in member states with regards to competitiveness. These are still there, and they 
are a matter to be addressed before the establishment of a stability mechanism for the euro 
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area, northern member states would not be willing to realize transfers to the south in order to 
converge. It is even more difficult to do so after the crisis because of the rise of Euroscepticism 
and the loss of the solidarity concept that help to shape the EMU in the first place.  
 
2.1.3 Governance 
 
Before the introduction of the euro the differences in governance were already known, but 
instead of being reduced, they have increased. For example, if we take a measure of 
perceptions of corruption and efforts to control it, we would see that during the last decade 
the levels of both have increased in southern Europe. As observed in Figure 5, the differences 
between the north (Germany, Benelux, Austria and Finland) and the south (Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland) of the euro zone are substantial. The differences are not only related to 
corruption perception or control, it has also to do with the rule of law, the efficiency of the 
public institutions, the regulatory quality and the shadow economy. It is easy to infer from this 
that in this context divergence is greater than it may seem because it is related with culture, 
with the roots of each country and the past of its citizens.  
 
Governance is the most difficult variable of convergence to change. It is a reality that culture 
among the EU is not the same, it should not be intended to be so because each country has its 
own identity and diversity is one of the factors that makes the EU a great project. It is also one 
of the founding values of the EU, but what about the European identity? This has not been so 
much developed, not in the older generations and not even with the youth generation which is 
the future of Europe. Strengthening the European identity could be a solution with regards to 
the governance divergence that exists and keeps growing in the euro area.  
 
Figure 7: Governance indicators  
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Source: https://voxeu.org/article/problems-eurozone 
 
Differences in behavior 
 
When the EU was created or the euro was adopted, it was already obvious that countries were 
different. Their culture, society and background make them different and thus it could be 
already expected that they would have divergent behaviors. The problem is when these 
behaviors lead to euro area disequilibrium and put at risk the euro survival. How national fiscal 
policies have been performed is an example of how these different behaviors affect the well 
being of the whole Eurozone.  
For example, from the nineties on, there was a decline in long term interest rates. Thus, it was 
an opportunity to reduce government debt. But whilst in the north of Europe they took 
advantage of this and reduce the level of public debt, in the south the opposite happened, 
because they took advantage of low long term interest rates to be less fiscally prudent. So 
instead of reducing debt levels they increased their debt to GDP ratio (Boltho and Carlin, 2012). 
Thus, if euro area member states are left with freedom to perform national fiscal policies, the 
result would be very different across the euro area. The consequences are easy to identify, if 
countries sharing a same currency behave in a very different way, no common stabilization for 
the zone can be established. This means that the mandate of the ECB becomes more difficult 
to be successfully applied and that the establishment of rules without any other tool of 
effective coordination or fiscal enforcement will result in a similar scenario than the one faced 
with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. Northern countries enjoying better fiscal 
positions coping with the consequences of the behavior of their colleagues and the 
vulnerability of the euro. However, the fact that they behave differently does not mean that 
north countries always comply with the fiscal rules established by the EU or that they always 
come up with the best policies. The issue to be highlighted in the above paragraphs is that they 
usually behave differently which results in disequilibrium and difficulties to attain a stabilized 
position as a currency union when this happens.  
This fact is related with the need of the euro area countries to attain cyclical convergence. 
Which means that economic cycles are the same across Eurozone members. This is needed for 
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the correct functioning of the euro. The ECB is in charge of the monetary policy and it bases its 
decisions on the overall economic performance of the euro area and not on individual cases.  
 
2.2 Business cycle convergence 
 
From the above analysis it can be clearly inferred the need for cyclical convergence in the euro 
area. The costs of convergence will not be easy to bear but they are necessary for the correct 
functioning of the EMU.  
 
Figure 8: Structural reform priorities for cyclical convergence in the euro area 
 
Source: Jacques Delors Institut, 2016 
 
There are some structural reforms that have to be prioritized to attain cyclical convergence for 
the euro area, the ones that are specified in Figure 8. As explained above, the divergence in 
competitiveness across the Eurozone is an issue to be addressed. The authors suggest that this 
could be addressed by lowering the barriers to entry to the service sector, which accounts for 
the 70% of EU GDP but only the 20% is traded across borders, this causes euro area economies 
to be isolated from each other and with a tendency towards cyclical divergence. Aside from 
deregulating the service sector, they propose single digital market in order to spread business 
models that would support the opening of new sectors of the economy that are not possible 
now because of the competitiveness fact (Brinke, Enderlein and Haas, 2016). 
After reforming the product market, the authors suggest a reform of the labor market.  As 
explained above the differences in labor markets, specially with regards to protection, 
contribute to the divergence of business cycles. The increase of labor market flexibility across 
the euro are is needed in order to enhance internal adjustments within the euro area. It would 
support the stabilization of the euro area by allowing for labor mobility (Brinke, Enderlein and 
Haas, 2016). 
The last step of reforms would be to incentivize investment. It is suggested that if there is a 
lack of private investment is because there is uncertainty in the market with regards to the 
regulation, and thus, this suggests that the regulation should be modified.  Reforms leading to 
more certainty in the regulatory aspects of several sectors, specially those that have a higher 
impact on the euro area economies.  The second aspect is with regards to private and public 
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investments, both financing the same project, these are beneficial because of the specific 
knowledge provided for the project. The potential benefits from these partnerships have to be 
recognized and thus, greater efforts to perform this type of investments should be considered. 
Lastly, there are euro area countries that have managed to have a fiscal space after the crisis, 
these should use it to renew their capital stock and increase the human capital in order to 
attain a durable recovery and to have potential prospects of growth (Brinke, Enderlein and 
Haas, 2016). 
 
These are some suggestions to solve the cyclical divergence of euro area member states. 
Member states may agree to establish these reforms or other ones, but the idea to retain from 
this is that in order to attain business cycle convergence and thus being able to further 
integrate and implement more ambitious fiscal mechanism, the Eurozone would have to 
perform structural reforms. These would be harder for some countries than for others, but the 
outcome would be a stronger Eurozone able to overcome future crises and to become a 
greater economic actor in the international sphere.  
 
3. Alternatives to the EU economic and monetary completion 
 
 
In section 3 I would present three alternatives to perform the completion of the EMU. The first 
one is the less intervening, it would leave more room to sovereign powers and it could be 
implemented without major reforms, the second one is a mix between a non union and a 
complete union that may allow to construct the basis for a future integration and require 
further changes in the current institutional setting, and the last one would be the implications 
of a more complete fiscal union. 
 
From the research performed I might conclude that there is consensus among experts in the 
sense that something has to change. There is broad consensus on the fact that the design of 
the EMU was not complete and therefore it was not prepared to overcome successfully a crisis 
like the global crisis that hit the EU in 2008. However, because of the rapid response by EU 
institutions the EMU has been able to recover from the crisis, however it can be considered a 
patch to the problem but not a definite solution because the measures were not implemented 
thinking in the long term.  
 
The three alternatives have aspects in common because of the identification of reforms to be 
made and what needs to be improved: 
 In the first place there is no effective mechanism of risk sharing in the euro area, 
moreover, the euro area is not able to address local shocks with any tool. Whilst for 
example the US, Canada or Germany are able to address the 80% compared to the 
Eurozone that is able to address a 40%. Monetary policy is the only tool at the 
Eurozone level but addressing asymmetric shocks is not its focus as it is handled by the 
ECB and it has to consider the situation of the whole Eurozone and no individual 
considerations when deciding on monetary policy.  Neither a fiscal insurance, there are 
federations like the US or Canada (even Germany) that are able to address a portion of 
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local shocks through an insurance scheme. For example, Germany can address a 10% 
whilst the US a 15% or Canada a 25%. The last sense in which the Eurozone lacks of a 
risk sharing mechanism is related to the role of capital markets and its low 
participation in fostering risk sharing (because of factors related to the banking sector 
that are not a purpose of this work) (IMF, 2014). Therefore, experts agree on the fact 
that actions have to be taken in order to accomplish an effective risk sharing 
mechanism in the Eurozone.  
 Debt restructuring in order to avoid insolvency risk. Legacy debt is one of the main 
issues with regards to the Eurozone fragility, it makes member states holding legacy 
debt considerably more vulnerable and compromises the capacity of the Eurozone to 
respond to future shocks. Moreover, the sole existence of legacy debt compromises 
the possible adjustments that are suggested in order to increase risk sharing among 
countries or other reforms more inclined towards more integration, in the scenario of 
a crisis or some kind of sudden shock member states would have diverse probabilities 
to subsist (Beck, 2016). Thus, a form to deal with legacy debt would be provided in 
each of the alternatives presented as all the authors consider that it is a source of 
vulnerability for the whole Eurozone and a barrier towards performing more reforms 
because the situation of euro area participants in this regard is very different. 
 Raise of populism and Euroscepticism.  The inability of the EU and more concretely the 
Eurozone to manage the crisis, the inability to recover EU growth and to provide equal 
opportunities along the EU have proven to raise separatism feelings. The EU cannot 
stand doing nothing in front of this challenge, the opposite should happen. If the EU is 
able to demonstrate that a future containing further integration would lead us to the 
best outcomes both in social and economic terms, it would manage to stop the raise of 
populism and Euroscepticism around the EU. It is clear that the EU is suffering from an 
identity crisis and the steps to be taken towards addressing fiscal issues are also 
related to this identity and the need to feed it properly (Beck, 2017 and Underhill, 
2017). The fiscal regime implemented until the moment has generated tensions 
among member states particularly between the so-called “South” states and the 
“North” states. Whilst the former have a tendency to regard adjustments from 
Brussels as a management of national policies that tend to generate social and 
economic harm, the “North” countries consider that the EU is being too flexible with 
the “South” and it is not complying with its main role, being the guardian of the 
treaties (Zetterlmeyer, 2017). This issue is not specifically addressed in any of the 
alternatives below because these are focused on the fiscal solutions for the Eurozone, 
however most of the authors (not to say all of them) have mentioned at some point of 
their studies the worrying aspect of the growing reluctance to the EU, and the lack of 
identity feeling among its citizens. So it is an aspect to take into account if any of the 
below reforms are put into practice. 
 
3.1 The non establishment of a fiscal union: towards coordination and 
effective surveillance 
 
The first proposal is abandoning the idea of a proper fiscal union. There have been debates 
and intentions to complete a fiscal union but all the initiatives have failed primarily because of 
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the reluctance of member states to delegate further sovereignty to the EU. Member states 
have already given up monetary policy so it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which they give 
up fiscal policy too.  
 
Another reason to reinforce the argument of abandoning the idea of creating a fiscal union is 
that the existing tools in order to address the centralization of fiscal policies, such as the Six 
Pack, the Two Pack, the European Semester and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in Europe have proven to fail, mainly because of countries’ differences (see 
section 1). EU member states have different understandings of fiscal policies, they impose 
taxes in different ways and with different aims, and the investments they make at national 
level are also very diverse. This means that the idea of a fiscal union is complicated to conceive, 
how to centralize fiscal policies if they are tight to culture and customs? The EU does not 
intend to make cultures across Europe to harmonize and thus the idea of centralizing policies 
that should be accepted across Europe put the idea of the fiscal union into a vulnerable place 
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2016). 
 
Moreover, the centralization of a fiscal policy might be regarded wrongfully as the provision of 
a public good. In this context, the argumentation is that there are contagious macroeconomic 
effects across borders. When there is financial instability in one of the member states it might 
spread across the rest of member states. Banks in the rest of states might hold sovereign 
bonds from the country suffering instability and so the effect is spread. In this sense the 
centralization of fiscal policy will not bring the major returns expected, if for example the 
public expenditure of country A increases (deficit) the demand for goods of country B will 
increase but so it would its prices and its interest rates and thus the first effect is offset. 
Therefore, the authors suggest that the benefits of a fiscal union might be overrated 
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2016). 
And they might be right, given the evident barriers of a creating a stronger union, and the 
urgency of taking action because a future crisis won’t wait until the Eurozone is ready to 
address it, maybe the best option is to forget about fiscal union and strengthen what we 
already have to be able to preserve sovereignty but at the same time save the EMU. 
 
Although not making further steps towards a fiscal union is not enough, they argue that banks 
should be prohibited from holding to much national sovereign debt in their balance sheets. 
This together with the no bailout rule, that has been working in the US since the second half of 
the nineteenth century, will make investors more cautious and will increase market discipline, 
which in turn will generate incentives for governments to reinforce their fiscal institutions and 
procedures so as to give a better performance in the market (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2016). 
 
Therefore, the starting point is that member states are going to remain responsible for their 
fiscal policy. In this context the Eurozone needs a reform of the SGP (see section 1) in order to 
ensure that discipline is followed (it has not been the case neither before or after the crisis), 
national fiscal councils will play a major role and also the European Fiscal Board (Andritzky et 
al., 2016). The function of fiscal councils and the European Fiscal Board would be to improve 
the current surveillance mechanism. It is argued that the current system is very complex, this is 
why some member states do not incorporate the rules, because these are not understood at 
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all levels. There are different rules and norms with regards to deficit and debts, structural 
benchmarks, the existence of both the SGP and the TSCG generates a complex system. 
Moreover, the Commission has introduced since 2015 (see section 1) more flexibility to the 
system with new rules that have made it even more opaque. This results in a system with a 
lack of both legitimacy and credibility, specially with regards to sanctions (Pisani-Ferry, 2016). 
 
3.1.1 Fiscal national councils and the European fiscal board 
 
What would be the future if we leave sovereign power to member states? Fiscal national 
councils and the introduction of national competitiveness boards (proposal by the Commission 
in 2015). Fiscal national councils were introduced with the Two-Pack set of rules that 
complemented the SPG (see section 1), and it established a deadline for its creation, October 
2013.  
These are public independent institutions that have the objective of reinforcing the 
compromise to maintain sound public finances. The Two- Pack defines them as a mechanism 
to monitor the compliance with fiscal rules and determine, by assessing the situation, the need 
to activate the corrective mechanism established by the Fiscal Compact.  
Fiscal councils are not exclusive to the EU, there are many countries around the world like 
Canada or the USA that have decided to create them. Some of them only focus in fiscal policies 
others make more in depth economic analysis. The common aspects among them is that they 
do not have decision power, and it is difficult that they do at some point because of the lack of 
legitimacy and the lack of consensus with regards to fiscal policy. However, they can correct 
some of the causes for unsound fiscal policies, like the lack of information. They can 
complement fiscal policies by acting as watchdogs of fiscal policies and alert if there are 
incentives to deviate from fiscal rules, and sometimes when fiscal rules proof to be very 
complex and its exact application in the country does not result in the most optimal policy, the 
fiscal council can determine if it is sensible to deviate from the policy (Calmfors and Wren-
Lewis, 2011). 
However, the ECB determined in its monthly bulletin in June 2014, the conditions for the EU 
established fiscal councils to have an effective and positive impact: being fully independent 
institutions, with no political interference at all, in order to attain institutional credibility. 
Having a comprehensive mandate, enough resources to deliver the mandate and a public voice, 
so as to be able to mobilize public opinion and fight against unsound fiscal policies. 
The problem is that not all mandates are the same across the EU. In any case the fiscal council 
is enabled to prepare macroeconomic or budgetary projections of the member state in 
question, most of them are just in charge of endorsing them (like is the case of Spain for 
example). In most EU countries another issue is related to the tasks assigned to these councils, 
in most cases these have gone beyond the regulation under the Two Pack, these include for 
example determining long term sustainability of fiscal policy, check the compliance with the 
rules, assess the economic situation of public enterprises, determine the cost of the policies 
and the quality of public finances. The assignment of these tasks are only adding more 
complexity to the system and distract the attention of the fiscal council towards other issues 
(ECB, 2014). 
The other disadvantage of the councils is the manner in which they are created is different 
across the EU, in order to assure its independence, the members of the council should be 
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appointed by the parliament and not by the government and they should be experts in the 
field. Also, some member states have few resources in the terms of expertise, they lack of 
enough experts with the knowledge and experience. 
Along with these disadvantages the ECB emphasizes its effectiveness, if fiscal councils manage 
to be fully independent public institutions they can be effective because they are able to use 
their position to influence on public opinion. In some member states, even if the 
recommendations of the council do not oblige, the government is required to “comply or 
explain”, so if they do not comply with the recommendations they have to offer public 
explanations for the reason of the deviations. 
The idea in order to use them to improve the current fiscal framework is that national fiscal 
councils would have their mandate amplified with further competences but concretely 
specified (Pisani- Ferry, 2016). 
Governments in turn would rely more in these councils. Councils would be granted gradually 
more room of maneuver because they would have more authoritative institutions to act in the 
framework of the SGP. Member states would have more incentives to follow the discipline 
because they would be following domestic principles, as these councils would be set at the 
domestic level and thus they are not seen as an imposition from above. The aim is to balance 
the need of overall policy consistency at the Eurozone level and the need of adaptation, 
because each country has its own structure and its own needs. How would the councils work? 
They would imitate competition authorities and specific regulators of each sector, and work as 
a network of councils around Europe, they would develop common methodologies among all 
the councils. It is still discussed the independence from the Commission and of their mandate, 
but the European Fiscal Board would be the hub of the network (Pisani- Ferry, 2016). 
The European Fiscal Board was created as a decision of the Commission, after the Five 
presidents’ report. It exists since October 2015. The tasks of this Board are to advise the 
Commission on fiscal matters, evaluate the implementation of EU fiscal rules and cooperate 
with national fiscal councils. Its relation with national fiscal councils is based on cooperation, 
exchange best practices and facilitate understanding on EU fiscal regulation. Although in the 
future it could have a more important role with regards to coordination because it would be 
the institution in charge of ensuring that national fiscal councils not only consider the national 
fiscal needs but also the Eurozone fiscal stance. 
The creation of national competitiveness boards needs to be considered too. In 2015 the 
Commission made a recommendation for the creation of these boards, for which the Council 
agreed upon. The deadline for its creation was 6 months after the approval of the 
recommendation. They recognize the need of a mechanism to correct macroeconomic 
disequilibrium in the Eurozone and also to adjust asymmetric shocks, the fact that a 
deterioration of competitiveness would have an impact on potential growth and on the ability 
of member states to repay debt (see section 2). So a good coordination among euro member 
states would help to align the competitiveness of the Eurozone with the good functioning of 
the EMU. National competitiveness boards will be independent institutions formed by experts 
that would follow the policies implemented in each member state with regards to 
competitiveness and contribute to foster sound policies at national level and at the same time 
improve the knowledge on which the economic policies of coordination in the EU are based. 
They would provide with strategic advice, taking into consideration the particularities of their 
country. Their vision of competitiveness should be broad, including cost aspects, but also 
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productivity, skills, attractiveness of the business environment and innovation. The boards 
would follow up competitiveness evolution of each country, provide with expert information 
to the member state with regards to wage setting mechanisms, without setting wages or 
interfering with the role and powers of social partners, they would monitor competitiveness 
policies and provide assessment, inform member states and the Commission throughout the 
European semester and be transparent by publishing annual reports. These measures are as 
well as in the case of national fiscal councils, for euro area members, but the rest of members 
are also encouraged to create them (European Commission, 2015). 
They would have an advisory function but again as in the case of the fiscal councils, they would 
be able to influence on public opinion, so that their recommendations are heard by member 
states and have an impact. That is why ensuring their independence is so important. The 
coordination would be held by the Commission that would be in charge of the contact with 
them and of the coordination of their points of view.  
The mechanism suggested in the last paragraphs would allow to avoid further integration but 
at the same time the European Fiscal Board, in the case of the national fiscal councils, and the 
Commission, in the case of the national competitiveness boards, should act as the institution 
defending the fiscal stance of the whole Eurozone and the institution able to coordinate 
member states and eliminate the vagueness in which many of the objectives or rules have 
been set, they would defend the fiscal stance of the Eurozone as a whole. At the same time, 
the mechanism should allow combine the flexibility that the EU Commission recognized is 
needed for the system, which implies that fiscal national councils and national competitiveness 
boards would identify for each member state the optimal fiscal policies in line with the rules 
but at the same time, in line with the member state’s structural fiscal set up and economic 
context. Also, by giving them more competences than the ones they currently enjoy, as 
explained above, they would be increase discipline. Instead of only endorsing economic 
projections with regards to fiscal and competition policies they would be able to prepare these 
projections so that member states would have to hear what they have to say before 
implementing the policies, and this would enhance the current system, strengthen discipline 
and above all coordination. 
In the sense that the Commission and the European Fiscal Board would act as the hub in the 
network of national councils and boards it might be considered an agency similar to the 
Eurostat in charge of harmonizing the methodology of measuring data with the aim of 
improving its quality. If such an agency for statistics existed, it would be easier for the hubs of 
the network to coordinate the councils and to compare the data and economic situation of 
each member state and thus provide better results.  
 
3.1.2 Reforming the SGP 
 
The other matter concerning the no fiscal union alternative is the reform of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). As said before the aim is to reduce the complexity and the vagueness of 
the current system, which might be the reason for its poor performance until the date. Also, if 
it is not reformed it might not be able to address successfully a future crisis.  
Two reforms are proposed to be undertaken with the aim of maintaining fiscal discipline in 
good economic times, when member states have a tendency towards accumulating low cost 
debt, and to avoid that national policies try to undermine the effect of Eurozone level policies. 
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The reforms would intend to give more flexibility to manage national fiscal policy in the short 
run but preserve solvency in the medium and long term. The first reform aims at replacing the 
current methods to identify recessions, because these are too mechanic and error prone, and 
instead appoint one or several independent bodies of experts in charge of identifying 
recessions using the methods they consider appropriate (more expertise is the key in order to 
correct the current methodology). These identification task might be given to either the 
European Fiscal Board or experts appointed by the Commission but in any case they must be 
independent and impartial. Once the recession is identified some fiscal rules would be 
modified in order to allow to increase spending in specific categories, for example 
unemployment benefits or active labor market policies. This modification might result in an 
increase in deficit but it would be allowed exceptionally, not under normal circumstances. This 
reform would introduce the flexibility that the current system does not have and that many 
member states facing financial distress have claimed for. The second reform would be related 
to the violations of the deficit and debt limits. Countries performing these violations would be 
allowed to have a set of policy options (if these policies contribute to more fiscal sustainability). 
It would include fiscal structural reforms that reduce fiscal responsibilities or that broaden 
revenue base, also reforms that favor growth and allow for a faster increase in GDP than debt. 
If the reforms presented by the member state are sufficiently strong (and are proven to be so 
by independent bodies) then the enlargement of the period of fiscal adjustment would be 
justified and in some cases the temporary increase of the deficit would be permitted (not 
under the current SGP). If the reforms (that would be divided in steps and closely monitored) 
are not met, then the fiscal adjustment would be reversed (Zettelmeyer, 2017). In order for his 
two reforms of the SGP to succeed, the Commission has to be regarded as a strong 
independent institution (politically speaking), otherwise the SGP would lack of credibility and it 
may rise political tensions among member states that may have divergent opinions on how to 
proceed in each case.  
 
3.1.3 Dealing with legacy debt  
 
Lastly, there is a further concern, what to do with legacy debt? Once there is a fiscal 
stabilization mechanism set, as proposed above and once fiscal rules are reformed, the EMU 
would still face large amounts of debt.  
The need of a mechanism to regulate debt restructuring responds to the need of creditors to 
assess correctly risks and thus demand realistic risk premiums. Also a mechanism like this 
would impose more discipline to governments with regards to their budgets, and in case of 
crisis, because the mechanism would be clear and divided by previously agreed phases 
uncertainty would be reduced. The mechanism would be applied as a part of the ESM, with the 
purpose of avoiding opportunistic behaviors of member states and make them maintain 
sustainable fiscal policies.  
 
How would the mechanism work?  
 
In the following paragraphs I would try to explain the proposal by Andritzky, Feld, Schmidt, 
Schnabel and Wieland, 2016. The mechanism would be implemented through the already 
existing ESM program. This means that it does not require further political integration or the 
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creation of any new institution. When a member state requires assistance to the ESM and the 
assistance is not provided because the assessment of its public debt has determined it is not 
sustainable (a situation of insolvency), the member state would be required to negotiate a 
debt restructuring, and its creditors would have to agree to extend eligible debt maturities for 
the duration of the ESM program. This standstill does not imply debt reductions from the part 
of creditors, at least not in the first phase, the purpose of debt restructuring is to make access 
to market durable and that the member state is able to repay ESM assistance. The proposal 
also considers how the debt sustainability analysis should be performed. It suggests that the 
ESM should perform the assessment because it would be the first interested to ensure 
repayment. The decision would imply a two stage system, first, the ESM would decide if it 
would require creditors to agree to a standstill (as explained before) at the start of the 
program. In the second stage, during the program, it would be negotiated if the 
restructuration needs to be deeper (the standstill has to be still in place when a deeper 
restructuring takes place). This decision system allows to maintain intact the ex ante 
disciplinary effect. 
 
Figure 9: Mechanism for dealing with debt restructuring through the ESM 
 
Source: https://voxeu.org/article/mechanism-proposal-eurozone-sovereign-debt-restructuring 
 
In the first stage of the decision system, the maturity extension would be provided in the case 
that the debt featuring Creditor Participation Clauses (CPCs) (*explained below) that has been 
assessed under the mechanism exceeds a range from 60% to 90% of GDP.  
Currently many member states already exceed the limit established, to solve the legacy issue 
only debt including new CPCs count towards thresholds. The common anchor for sound fiscal 
policy, as stated in the SGP and the IMF is around 60%. The need to establish the threshold is 
also related to ex ante discipline recognized by creditors so that they form clear expectations.  
The authors consider that it would also be beneficial to include in the requirements not only 
the threshold but also compliance with fiscal rules. To assess a country capacity to perform 
fiscal adjustment it would be useful to examine the record of a country under existing fiscal 
rules. This would incentivize governments to comply with fiscal rules because their past 
compliance would be taken into account. These measures would have the objective to reduce 
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threshold effects, that is why they suggest providing limited discretion to policymakers (guided 
by a technical analysis from the ESM). 
In the second stage of the decision, the ESM would decide if the country that has asked for 
assistance, based on the analysis performed, needs to perform a deeper debt restructuration 
before the program ends (during the time the standstill is still in place).  
The first stage would solve a liquidity problem of a state, whilst the second, requiring more 
time, would solve a solvency crisis. This represents a major change compared to the current 
system because the ESM is only able to provide financial assistance in a situation of liquidity 
but not of insolvency. It also helps to address the issue of the ESM having to recognize in which 
situation the country requiring the assistance finds itself, because it has already been the case 
in the past that macroeconomic indicators and data was not as accurate as it should. 
These mechanism has one major drawback which is the potential holdouts that might occur 
due to the standstill agreement by creditors. What could potentially happen is that 
bondholders (which are very diverse) of government’s sovereign debt would try to obtain the 
best deal possible by negotiating with the state (this happened when Argentina in 2001 did a 
disordered restructuration of debt). The solution for this are the Collective Action Clauses 
which is a supermajority amendment mechanism. This implies that bondholders at the time of 
buying a bond commit on the fact that if the qualified majority of bondholders agree on a 
restructuring plan that a state submits, the plan would be binding for all of them (Martinelli, 
2016). The authors propose to rely on CACs (which they refer to as CPCs) for orderly 
restructurings and consolidate voting procedures into a single limb (one vote for one 
bondholder, the new clauses would be called Creditor Participation Clauses. The current 
system in place in the euro area for CACs require a qualified majority of 75% of bondholders 
for each bond issues, the single limb proposal aims at avoiding that an investor acquires a 
blocking majority in small bond issues (which would leave CACs ineffective) and this is likely to 
happen because of the great number of bonds that are issued. This instrument would allow for 
one single vote for all the affected instruments, which would eliminate potential blocking 
minorities. The IMF in October 2014 also proposed the enhancement of the CACs by being able 
to differentiate among bondholders. The modification would ensure the aggregation across all 
debt containing CPCs. Other bond reforms would include the pari passu clause modification. 
The pari passu clause in this context would imply that the debtor, in this case a sovereign 
government, that had this clause included in old bond contracts, could not give a new creditor 
better conditions than the ones in the old contracts if these conditions are not recognized to 
the old creditors (bondholders). It can thus be understood that a clause like this might need to 
be modified in order to protect the restructuring deal against possible lawsuits of the already 
bondholders (in the case that old debt is restructured in different terms).  
The implementation of the mechanism would be easier than other proposals, it is build on the 
ESM Treaty that demands private sector involvement to be considered. So the only 
modification needed would be to amend the ESM guidelines to make the ESM assistance to be 
provided under the new two stage mechanism.  
Over time the mechanism would start to have its results, countries would gradually replace the 
existing debt with the new debt that include the new CPCs.  
The authors emphasize that their proposal would not imply a loss of fiscal discretion in favor of 
a restructuring mechanism. 
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All in all, a mechanism like this would increase the credibility of the bail out clause and would 
allow for an orderly mechanism that could be put into place in a reasonable period of time, 
which is an advantage compared to other proposals because of the already existing need for 
member states to reduce legacy debt. It is true that the system requires private sector 
participation, but the ESM already included the possibility so it is not an impossible reform. 
 
3.1.4 Analyzing the first alternative 
 
This first alternative would be the easier to implement in the short term because it does not 
require major reforms or collective actions, it is constructed on the basis of already created 
institutions, which is an advantage if we consider the urgency of providing for euro area 
solutions.  
 It would effectively address the need of a strong fiscal coordination mechanism for the euro 
area, introduce sense of risk sharing among member states, and it would provide with more 
flexibility with regards to fiscal rules to provide maneuver at the time of addressing country 
specific shocks. Thus it would serve as a solution to provide for macroeconomic stabilization.  
Lastly, it would deal with legacy debt by an orderly restructuring thanks to the introduction of 
CPCs debt that has a twofold objective setting a framework for effective and orderly debt 
restructuring and enhancing discipline over national fiscal policy (as the access to the ESM 
program would depend on ex ante behavior).  
Thus, the proposal presented is able to overcome the major challenges that need to be 
addressed at the euro area. However, it is not evident that the proposal would serve as a 
durable solution. After all, leaving member states performing fiscal policies alone is risky, even 
if there is a coordination mechanism set into place. The coordination of fiscal policies might 
not be enough, specially in times of economic booms or constant good economic situations. 
The enforcement mechanism might be too weak; it is based on discipline provided by 
independent councils but sanctions that could be implemented in case of disobedience might 
not be effective (as has been the case in the last crisis). Also the reform of the SGP rules to 
allow for more flexibility at times of recession, without the proper control might lead to 
undesirable outcomes. With regards to the debt restructuring scheme, the advantage would 
be its rapid implementation, however, in the long term, depending on the future of the ESM 
program it might not be the best alternative available for the issue of dealing with legacy debt. 
All in all, the biggest advantage of this package of measures is its ability to meet with the 
urgency requirements, and the largest drawback might be its lack of durability in the long term.  
 
3.2 Between a coordination mechanism and a future union 
 
This proposal suggests that creating now a common fiscal policy is not viable. It would require 
constitutional reforms that are hard to accomplish, however more coordination is needed. This 
alternative is intended to provide the basis for a future fiscal union, the supporters of the 
creation of a common budget or a common fiscal capacity argue that the Eurozone needs a 
mechanism that allows for long term sustainability, a Eurozone common budget would provide 
with this need. The other side of the proposal is related to dealing with legacy debt through 
the PADRE plan proposal.  
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3.2.1 A Central Fiscal Capacity for the Eurozone 
 
The ESM is the Eurozone’s lending capacity (see section 1); the problem with this scheme is 
that it does not provide for macroeconomic stabilization. In the following paragraphs there is 
further explanation on why the ESM is not enough for macroeconomic stabilization in the euro 
area and the proposals related to addressing which mechanism could be established so as to 
serve as a durable stabilization tool. 
 
  
 
The ESM is not enough  
 
First of all, in order to access the assistance programs of the ESM there are several conditions 
to be met, set by the EU that in most cases imply a lost of sovereignty (see section 1). This fact 
reduces the incentives for member states to ask for help to the ESM as they would likely not 
be willing to loose more sovereignty in favor of the EU. The other issue is with regards to the 
perception of member states towards less stable member states after the crisis, the 
willingness to give assistance through a common instrument might not be appealing for them 
(Bénassy-Quéré and Giavazzi, 2017).  Another fact is that the ESM is regarded by creditors as a 
mechanism of crisis assistance available for member states which makes them undervalue the 
risks of lending to member states that are over indebted (Andritzky et al., 2016).   
Other issues are related to ESM’s governance. In order to activate one of the tools of the ESM 
to support a member state it is required unanimity (and in some cases prior approval by 
national parliaments). What does this imply? This means that implementation of the measures 
may take too long and at the same time it introduces a bit of uncertainty, financial markets do 
not know for sure if the ESM will support the member state facing distress. Thus, this is a 
major disadvantage because one of the main objectives of the ESM is to provide with 
credibility to member states that have lost access to market. Second, its resources. The current 
lending capacity is of 500 billion euros, which is the equivalent to a 5% of the Eurozone GDP, 
this amount would not be able to address a systemic crisis.  Other issues of reform are related 
with the role of the ESM. The ESM has faced in the past (2010-2012) some pressures to act and 
cope with the refinancing of unsustainable debt, due to the lack of clarifying rules related to 
debt restructuration. This is not the ESM mandate; the ESM was established as a patch to deal 
with liquidity crises of member states but we cannot forget it is a lending capacity, it does not 
provide for transfers, and its objective is not to cope with insolvency of member states.  
This is why the ESM is unable to provide for an effective macroeconomic stabilization tool and 
in the following paragraphs the proposals considered in order to create such a mechanism are 
presented. 
 
The Central Fiscal Capacity 
 
A recent proposal by the IMF considers the creation of a Central Fiscal Capacity (CFC) for the 
euro area. The CFC proposed by the IMF would have a twofold objective: from the one hand it 
would act in case of a recession providing for macroeconomic stabilization, and from the other 
hand it would have a preventive function. The preventive function responds to the fact that 
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the CFC would be a tool to enhance investors’ credibility because of having implemented a 
tool to deal effectively with future crises. It has been proved that the monetary policy alone is 
not able to address a crisis, a common fiscal tool would allow to complement monetary policy 
and avoid pro cyclical policies that in the last crisis led some member states to deeper 
recessions. The scheme should be automatic to avoid disputes and discretion. If it is not 
automatic, member states would likely dispute over indicators of the CFC to establish the 
transfers for example.  
Euro area countries would participate in the scheme every year with the objective of building 
up assets in good times. In times of recession, and conditionally on the deepness of it, member 
states would receive transfers to offset budget needs of member states. In the context of a 
crisis and in the case that the funds are not enough, the CFC would be allowed to borrow and 
the loans that it would commit to would be repaid by member states’ future contributions. 
The main objective would be providing fiscal stabilization, by providing transfers and 
contributions, revenue fluctuations and cyclical spending would be counterbalanced.  
 
A scheme like this can only be implemented if it is politically feasible so it has to provide the 
appropriate incentives so that member states want to be part of the CFC; they would take into 
consideration the opportunity cost of the contributions they would have to make to the 
scheme. This mechanism would entail moral hazard risks because of the incentives of member 
states to perform unsound fiscal policies with the prospects of having this tool at the euro area 
level that would cope with the possible negative consequences. The IMF proposes that 
member states create medium term fiscal frameworks (MTFFs) that strictly comply with fiscal 
rules to ensure sustainable fiscal policy at the same time that stability is provided. These 
MTFFs would be a perquisite to participate in the scheme and must be consistent with the 
euro area fiscal rules.  
 
With regards to fiscal rules the IMF suggests a reform of the existing ones to allow for 
automatic enforcement. According to the IMF, the current fiscal framework is too complex. 
The complexity makes it difficult to determine when a country does not comply. However, if 
the rules are simplified the system would become more transparent and thus monitoring 
would be easier. This would enhance the link between compliance and CFC transfers. There 
are proposals by the IMF of how to simplify the fiscal rules, focusing on shifting to a single 
indicator such as debt ratio (focus on debt sustainability), combined with an expenditure 
growth rule and complemented with a debt correction mechanism to link the expenditure 
growth rule with the debt ratio anchor. The objective of this reform of the SGP would be to 
allow for flexibility in times of downturns, when a country is facing a recession it would be 
using transfers from the CFC in order to maintain the spending that would have been 
previously set in the medium term fiscal frameworks. 
 
Two concerns would rise with this scheme: permanent transfers and moral hazard.  
In order to address moral hazard concerns the IMF proposes that the transfers are conditional 
on compliance of EU fiscal rules this would provide ex ante incentives to comply, because 
access to the transfers would depend on past fiscal performance and having taken the 
appropriate reforms.  
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In order to address permanent transfers concerns the IMF proposes that the member states 
that receive net transfers during recessions would have to pay for premiums in good times. So 
they would make extra contributions based on the usage they have made from the fund and 
their cyclical position. The indicator that has been suggested to determine the economic 
situation of a country with regards to recovery is the unemployment rate. It is true that the 
establishment of the premium has to be carefully set because one of the main objectives of 
the CFC is to generate fiscal sharing risks and thus this should not be harmed by the imposition 
of a premium.  Another measure to overcome this concern is to limit, from the one hand net 
cumulative transfers to countries that have increasing structural unemployment (as this would 
be the indicator proposed by the IMF to determine the transfers), and from the other hand, 
limit the net cumulative contributions to avoid that a member state becomes a systematically 
net contributor to the scheme (this implies that the CFC would need to borrow more in order 
to meet the requirements). The reason justification behind choosing unemployment rate as 
the trigger to provide transfers is that it is a good measure of the output gap and a harmonized 
indicator across the Eurozone (IMF, 2018). 
 
The IMF does not include a specific allocation of the funding provided by the transfers as it 
considers that priorities vary from country to country. If the euro area were to decide to set an 
allocation for the transfers, such as maintaining public spending during recessions or to finance 
unemployment benefits it might limit the stabilization function of the CFC and it might also be 
insufficient for general shocks.  
 
This scheme proposed by the IMF would be beneficial for the euro area because it would 
provide it with the necessary macroeconomic tool that is lacking now. It would provide the 
right policy mix between monetary policy and fiscal policy (which is not currently available). 
The euro area would have an instrument to respond to country specific shocks and also to 
euro area shocks, with the support of the CFC, member states would be able to perform 
counter cyclical policies in their countries and at a supranational level the CFC would be used 
to stimulate expansionary policies at times of systemic shocks. It would also improve fiscal 
discipline because of the conditionality to participate in the scheme, so countries would have 
incentives to comply with fiscal rules ex ante in order to access the fund. Lastly, the CFC would 
help to avoid that a liquidity crisis evolves into an insolvency crisis, by its existence, the CFC will 
avoid sudden rises in the borrowing costs of member states. The CFC provides with credibility 
to investors because it is a common system of stabilization backed by all euro area economies.  
 
The IMF proposes three different alternatives regarding the creation of the CFC. The first one 
is a common unemployment insurance fund (which is included in the last alternative of this 
work). The second one is the creation of a euro area budget; this idea will be further 
developed in the following paragraphs by proposals of other authors. 
 
Euro area budget 
 
The common budget would be different from the ESM because it would not be providing loans. 
The proposal suggests the budget to be financed by an amount of the 2% of the GDP of the 
Eurozone. There are different proposals to determine the objective of the common budget. 
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From the one hand, using the common budget as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. The aim 
of this proposal is to avoid fiscal policies being managed solely by member states who would 
only take into account their own interest, trying to benefit from the efforts of others. The 
Eurozone needs to overcome this self interested policies in order to provide for stability at a 
larger scale. A common budget would be able to do so. Usually federal budgets tend to be 
larger than the one proposed (a 2 % of Eurozone’s GDP) but this has an explanation: they need 
to provide common public goods. In the case of the Eurozone the public good to be provided 
would be financial stability. And it would be possible because it would be focused on 
addressing big shocks and being balanced from cycle to cycle. The focus in big shocks means 
that in a first phase of its implementation the budget would be established as a tool to support 
member states during recessions to apply counter cyclical fiscal policies. This would overcome 
the disadvantages that the IMF poses for this suggestion as it argues that a budget focused on 
providing common goods (common defense or border protection) will not provide for 
stabilization.  
To consider the the structuration of the budget there are several points to bear in mind. The 
principle of distributional neutrality which implies no net transfers over certain periods of time. 
A model like this implies that a member state facing a strong shock during a recession would 
be receiving net transfers from the budget during a period of time but later on, it would have 
to compensate so as to balance the transfers that were received. In the long run the net 
transfers that were received would be zero. Revenues for the budget would come in a first 
phase from national budgets (as considering a European tax is too unrealistic in the current 
situation). The key for the system to work would be to link the support from the Eurozone 
budget to some conditions related to the implementation of certain fiscal policies and to 
reforms. In relation to the effectiveness of the budget one could argue that it has been the 
case of counter cyclical fiscal policies that do not deliver the expected results because of 
forecasting errors. This implies that sometimes discretionary actions are not the best because 
they require a strong decision making center that uses reliable information and takes the 
optimal decisions for each state, and that maybe the best option is to implement automatic 
stabilizers which imply setting ex ante rules to the system. With this mechanism in case of a 
shock the enforceability is easier (Wolff, 2012). 
 
From the other hand, another proposal is to create a budget used to finance cross border 
Eurozone level projects, managed by a Eurozone level entity, able to obtain revenues, spend 
and borrow. This proposal is recognized by the IMF as an alternative to the CFC and it also 
states that a common budget for the euro area would better provide for macroeconomic 
stabilization if it is able to borrow because revenues to be paid to the budget would be cyclical. 
This entity, in order to be politically feasible, would have a budget lower than national ones, it 
would not be entitled to perform distributive or allocation functions and it would be combined 
with other mechanisms to reduce risks and improve incentives (Zettelmeyer, 2017). 
In the long run, if the funds from such an entity were destined to implement necessary 
reforms, member states would have more incentives to reform their labor markets (which is a 
step towards definitive convergence) as the political resistance may be reduced because of the 
financing by common funds. The common budget would also help the Eurozone to confront 
future crisis and eventually be the basis for further integration (creation of a European 
Treasury) (Beck, 2016).  
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The size of the budget would be like the one of the first proposal, around a 2% of Eurozone’s 
GDP, the author suggested in 2016 that it could be financed with a pre agreed cyclical revenue 
source like a Eurozone VAT or a Eurozone corporate tax. With regards to spending, this would 
be controlled by a Eurozone finance minister. The spending of the funds could be agreed upon, 
by establishing some limits and some guidelines ex ante (the spending should be enough big so 
as to have a macroeconomic impact). The scheme considers that the funds could be used to 
realize public investments or to provide national governments with nominally fixed “cheques” 
that would be set in proportion to national GDPs (so as to avoid permanent transfers). The 
result would be automatic stabilization, during recessions revenues would be lower than the 
fixed nominal spending and the opposite would happen during booms.  
This scheme includes the possibility of borrowing. The amount that the entity would be 
allowed to borrow would be limited by rules set ex ante. It would be limited because the 
revenues assigned to the scheme would be constraining it, with the assigned revenues the 
debt accumulated would have to be repaid.  The advantage of this scheme is that the 
Eurozone debt accumulation would not be very high because the objective is to be able to 
perform expansionary policies during recessions, which would imply more Eurozone debts, 
and maintaining a AAA rating because the asset would be guaranteed by all the Eurozone 
participants (Zettelmeyer, 2017). 
 
The author (Beck, 2017) proposes a focalization of the spending of the common budget in the 
European young generation. I found this proposal interesting because it is able to address two 
issues at the same time. First, the creation of a common fund would imply a risk sharing 
mechanism, and second the focus on the young generation, which is the future of the 
Eurozone, would allow to solve populism issues and Euroscepticism. In order to do this, 
measures incentivizing growth should be taken and at the same time there is need of political 
courage. 
The focus on the young generation is extracted from the fear that there is a lost young 
generation in the EU that has suffered very hardly the consequences of the crisis. It is true 
than in some countries more than others, some of them have managed to implement 
programs, like in the case of Austria or Germany, like vocational training or apprenticeship 
institutions that have proved to be effective. However, the need to implement more measures 
has been recognized by the European Commission that in 2013 launched the Youth Guarantee 
scheme, it relies on successful experiences of some Nordic countries to combine early 
intervention with activation policies, to improve school to work transition and the labor 
market outcomes of the youths (Dolado, 2015).  These programs and the concerns it generates 
at EU level justify that the common budget of the Eurozone take into account that for the EU 
to have a future the young have to feel supported and at the same time be able to access the 
same (or at least similar opportunities) throughout the EU.  
 
3.2.2 Dealing with debt restructuring 
 
This represents one side of the proposal, the other side includes the issue of debt restructuring 
and the creation of a collective tool in order to preform the restructurings.  
The proposal of a collective restructuring responds to the different situations which member 
states are facing, there are member states with high and unsustainable debts and other that 
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hold debts but are far from the unsustainable situation of their colleagues. Also, if countries 
had to restructure their debt unilaterally, there would be fears of who goes first and who bears 
first the risks, and thus no one would want to be the first one to act. Moreover, in the case 
that the restructuring of debt is done in an isolated manner, the negative externalities would 
not be taken into account by member states. When there is a debt restructuration there are 
effects for debtholders, which in most cases include banks from other member states, this 
means that the effect would be spread to other countries that might be facing the losses of the 
action of the member state doing the restructuring. On the other hand, the collective tool for 
restructuring debt would take into account these externalities and thus it would be able to 
assign to the member state facing the restructuring the corresponding losses. 
Other advantages of a collective tool include the the possibility to agree on a burden sharing, it 
can be done through transfers, and officials in member states might be able to agree on the 
share instead of being imposed by an external and foreign authority. 
The last argumentation in favor of the collective tool is the reduction of moral hazard actions. 
The collective tool would give guarantees to member states to avoid unilateral and 
independent actions of debt restructuring that might generate negative externalities.  
 
Debt restructuring: the PADRE proposal 
 
The Politically Acceptable Debt Restructuring in the Eurozone was first proposed by Pâris and 
Wyplosz in 2014. Why do authors agree on the necessity of debt to be restructured?  
First of all, they argue that it is not a novelty in history. In the past there have been successful 
stories of debt restructuring. They argue that in the case that governments default instead of 
making a debt restructuring consequences would be worse because the costs of the default 
would be dealt mainly by debt holders. So they consider that not restructuring debt may lead 
to a scenario of costs that is not desirable. 
Another reason is to restructure debt concerns the benefits from sovereign indebtedness. 
They argue that whilst it is desirable to have a certain level of debt, because it serves for 
profitable investments that turn out in economic growth, when the level of debt surpasses a 
certain limit it does not generate economic growth anymore, on the contrary it limits 
economic growth of the country holding excessive debt. This would imply the existence of a 
debt threshold, for which at a certain level of debt instead of incentivizing economic growth 
the opposite effect is generated. In this sense we can observe in a graphic from Eurostat the 
level of debt across the EU which shows the General government debt for 2015 and 2016, 
Figure 8. In this graphic the threshold is considered to be between the 60% and 80% of debt as 
a percentage of GDP. We can observe that there is a considerable number of countries in the 
EU with levels of debt substantially higher, among them, Spain. This would mean that these 
countries have unsustainable levels of debt, and that their public spending instead of fostering 
growth is having the contrary effect. 
 
Figure 10: General government consolidated gross debt, % of GDP, 2015 vs 2016 
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Source: Eurostat. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Government_finance_statistics 
 
Together with the argumentation that high levels of public debt lead to undesirable limitations 
of economic growth we find ourselves with another argumentation for debt restructuration. 
That is, fiscal policy is the only tool left for member states to respond to shocks, they cannot 
longer use monetary policy as it has been centralized, therefore when they are facing an 
economic downturn they might respond with expansionary fiscal policies. The problem is that 
if the starting point is a high level of debt, we would enter into a cycle, in which debt would 
keep growing to even more unsustainable levels. That is a reason why the starting point of 
debt should be a sustainable one in order to let member states apply expansionary policies if 
they wish. 
Another argument is that high debt levels can lead easily to debt crisis (which we have in fact 
experienced since 2010). When there are increases in the interest rates, it becomes more 
expensive to implement expansionary fiscal policies because the costs of borrowing raise. In 
turn, when a level of debt is already high, debt markets reflect their fear of failure with higher 
risk premia, and thus borrowing costs raise even more leading to a debt crisis.  
These are the reasons provided to implement the PADRE plan and restructure the debt of EU 
member states. 
 
The PADRE proposal consists on transferring debt held by the government to debt held by a 
central bank. In a simple example the idea would be that the Central Bank buys a certain 
percentage of debt required by their government at face value. The Central bank injects cash 
into economy worth the percentage of GDP that the government whishes to reduce debt. To 
avoid inflation, the Central bank issues its own debt at the market interest rate. What has 
happened is a swap from debt of the government to debt of the Central Bank.   
The government pays back the debt to the central bank and the payments serve the Central 
bank to honor its own debts. The government has no incentives to default because it owns the 
Central Bank and as economy grows the value of the bond owned by the Central Bank decline 
as a proportion of the GDP, and eventually the ratio goes to zero.  
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Central Bank Balance Sheet 
Liabilities Assets 
CB notes issued to buy government debt 
 
X $ 
Government bonds 
 
X $ 
 
In the case that the CB is able to borrow at a lower interest rate than the government (which 
usually it is) there would be a benefit for the CB, which in turn, as the CB is owned by the 
government it is just a transfer from one institution to the other so its irrelevant. The danger in 
this transformation of debt is that governments may have incentives to accumulate debt with 
the prospective that it would be eliminated by this mechanism of debt monetization. To 
eliminate this there has to be an institutional change in order to introduce fiscal discipline.  
 
This is the idea made simple, but how would it be implemented in the Eurozone? 
 
In the case of the Eurozone we have to consider two aspects: 
Wants to reduce % 
debt/GDP by 20% 
Buys 20% worth of 
government’s GDP 
at market rate 
CEI INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS                                                             Nº 2/2018, 25 DE MAYO DE 2018 
COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
MÁSTER EN DIPLOMACIA Y FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA INTERNACIONAL 
 45 
1. There is one central bank for several countries. National central banks are the owners 
of the ECB (% of the capital).  
2. Transfers among countries have to be eliminated. This responds to the fact that if the 
ECB solely buys bonds from the Spanish government, and then the Spanish 
government defaults, the losses would be faced by the ECB shareholders which are all 
the member states participating in the ECB capital. 
 
In the Eurozone it would be necessary that member states agreed and jointly asked the ECB to 
take action. It has to be jointly because in the case they act separately, as explained before, 
they would act opportunistically and fear each other’s actions causing the eventual inaction 
and thus the accumulation of debt.  
Member states would ask the ECB to buy debt at face value. The face value of a bond is the 
amount paid to the holder at maturity (date in which the transaction comes to an end). The 
acquisitions would be made in proportion to the % owned by each national central bank of the 
ECB. So if the Spanish central bank owns a 15% of the ECB, the ECB would dedicate a 15% of 
debt acquisition to the Spanish government bonds. 
Then the debts acquired by the ECB would be transformed into zero interest perpetuities. This 
is for two reasons, first in order to avoid country transfers because countries borrow at 
different interest rates (even more in the current public debt crisis) and thus they start from 
different positions (the risk premium member states face is different, if the ECB were to buy 
government bonds at the market interest rate and the corresponding government is unable to 
repay, the default would be spread among ECB shareholders, that is Eurozone States). The 
second reason is to avoid governments incentives to accumulate debt or default on their 
bonds because the losses would be borne by the rest of member states. 
Then these zero interest perpetuities would have the same face value as the initial bonds 
which are replaced. The balance sheet of the ECB would be the following: 
 
European Central Bank Balance Sheet 
 
Liabilities Assets 
ECB notes 
 
X $  
Zero interest bonds acquired at face value 
 
X $ 
- carrying costs (= interests paid by the ECB in 
order to repay its debt) 
 
 
 
 
 
 ECB income is reduced 
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The losses are incurred as time passes, depending on the maturity the ECB has chosen for its 
notes, thus the present value of the losses would equal the amount of the debt that has been 
cancelled because of the swap into zero interest perpetuities.  
The present discounted value is the current worth of a sum of money (in this case of losses) 
given a specified rate of return (the market rate at which the ECB has been borrowing). 
Eventually we have that the debt is cancelled without any country transfers, because the ECB 
transfers the losses in proportion to the participation in the ECB capital, and that each member 
state pays back its debt with reduced profit transfers from the ECB.  
 
The result would be the elimination of excessive debt and the assimilation of government 
debts by future taxpayers over time.  
 
This would work, as the authors argue, as long as there is a contractual arrangement. This 
mechanism would generate losses and thus the distribution of these losses might bring some 
political issues. This might be solved with a previous arrangement among member states. 
Another condition for this mechanism to work should be that governments would have to be 
required to establish fiscal discipline as a pre condition to access this mechanism. The SPG is 
supposed to require this fiscal discipline but it is not effective or not as much as expected, 
because in some occasions it has been regarded as a tool against the sovereignty of member 
states regarding this issue. Maybe another type of institutional reform might be implemented, 
that respects member states sovereignty over fiscal discipline but at the same time 
accomplishes the aim of it being effectively implemented in order to access an orderly debt 
restructuring. 
 
Regarding the control mechanism, we should consider how the system would assure that after 
the debt is restructured the member state does not incur in debt accumulation and return to 
unsustainable debt levels. In this case, the proposal is to establish a % limitation (ratio of debt/ 
GDP) that the state cannot increase. The % allowed should be sufficient so as to allow member 
states to implement fiscal policies to respond to economic shocks (which is one of the main 
reasons for the creation of this mechanism). 
In the case that a member state breaks its compromise and increases the % of debt by more of 
the allowed amount the ECB would be able to ask for the reimbursement of the perpetuities 
that it holds from the member state in question. The reimbursement would correspond to the % 
increase in debt higher than the limit established.  
To reimburse this amount, it is probable that the member states needs to issue bonds, thus it 
needs to accumulate more debt. Together with this increase in the level of debt, the cost of 
borrowing would also rise as a response to the increase in risk that investors would have to 
The losses are passed to Member States in 
proportion to their share in the ECB capital 
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bear when buying government’s bonds. This mechanism would allow to maintain market 
discipline and a probable moral hazard, with the aim of attaining more responsible fiscal 
policies to avoid these consequences. 
It might be the case that the member state does not recognize the conversion of the 
perpetuities into bonds. In this case it would be treated as a default situation, and the ECB 
would have to be entitled to take action. Some of the proposals include the write off from the 
ECB books, the sale of the bonds at a discount rate (which means that it is sold at a lower value 
than the face value) to debtors of the violator government (and so the bonds would be used to 
repay debt to the government) or for example transferring the perpetuities to the EU budget 
in exchange of financial contributions that are destined to the member state that is defaulting. 
These ideas try to create an effective sanction system in order to prevent violations to the 
norms of the mechanism and thus ensure that it will work and attain its objectives. 
 
There has to be considered the case of political tension. Meaning that the defaulting 
government may try to convince its colleagues to waive its obligation to repay back the debt 
held by the ECB. In the PADRE plan the losses that would result from the default as well as the 
share to be beard by the member states would be known in advance so that might be an 
incentive for member states to not accept such behaviors. On the other hand, other clauses 
might be included in the agreement, to recognize situations in which some member states 
might decide to waive the payment from the government defaulting. In this case it is necessary 
to create a mechanism in which the countries signing for this decision are the ones bearing the 
losses from the reduction in the ECB income because of the default in payments.  
 
The final issues with this proposal are related with the role of the ECB. The proposal is 
intended to be a one-time action, which means that the debt restructuration would occur only 
once. For this to be credible the proper market discipline must be implemented, that is why 
the sanctions system is important so as to member states to behave after the action has taken 
place. Another risk is related to the independency of the ECB, from the one side it is the EU 
Council the one that should ask the ECB to implement the PADRE plan, and not a decision of 
the ECB as that would imply it to incur into political issues. From the other side it is also 
necessary for an independent agent to be the one automatically converting the perpetuities in 
interest bonds once violations occur to avoid the risk of politicization.  
 
The costs of the plan are estimated to be of 4,500 billion euros, to determine its feasibility it 
has to be considered the present discounted value of the costs of the debt restructuration and 
the present discounted value of infinite seignorage. The seignorage is the revenue attained 
when the money created is worth more than the costs of producing it. The feasibility will 
depend on the future economic growth rate and the future interest rate. The way these 
indicators move determines the value of seignorage. However, the value of the future interest 
rate cannot be controlled by policymakers, instead it depends on the sum of the inflation rate 
(which in the Eurozone is expected to remain constant) and the natural real interest rate 
(which depends on the financial market, global spending and productive investments). 
Therefore, in order for the plan to be feasible is important to enhance economic growth in 
order to increase the need of currency, and thus seignorage. 
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Figure 11: Estimated present value of seigniorage revenues (billion euros) 
 
 
Source: Pâris and Wyplosz (2014) 
 
The table shows how higher rates of growth it is easier to surpass the costs of the program. As 
the level of interest rate increases the present value of seignorage decreases making it more 
difficult to meet the costs of the program, that is because higher interest rates mean higher 
discount rate, and thus lower present discounted value of seignorage. 
For example, in the case studied by the authors, with an inflation rate of 2% and a GPD growth 
rate of 1,5%, the ratio of perpetuities to Eurozone GDP after 20 years would have been 
reduced at half, and after 50 years it would be of 18%. 
 
All in all, even if the financing of the PADRE program is complex and might need further 
readjustments, it can be feasible. If nothing is done to stop debt accumulation it would only 
imply a greater amount of debt to be dealt with in the future, resulting in more difficult 
implementation of any type of restructuring plan. Most of the authors defending the idea of 
forgetting about a fiscal union but taking other actions instead, agree on the fact that the 
current debt ratios are not sustainable and that there is no time to waste. As time passes the 
solution would be harder to implement and there is agreement about the limits that overall 
debt accumulation in the EU is limiting economic growth. 
This plan also takes into account the need to give member states more sovereignty with 
regards to fiscal policy. The SPG has resulted in poor results because of this exact reason, 
member states have already given up the monetary policy tool to respond to economic shocks, 
giving them sovereignty on fiscal policies would allow them to have a tool of response to 
disruptions. But this comes at a cost, they have to comply with market discipline, this includes 
the need to start from lower levels of debt in order to be able at a needed time to implement 
expansionary fiscal policies.  
 
This alternative is more complex than the first one because first of all it implies the creation of 
a budget for the Eurozone. This would help to stabilize the financial situation of the Eurozone 
and if it were created with the ability to borrow it would represent a long term stability 
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function for the euro area. The proposal of the stability bonds is substitutive of the common 
budget and it might proof to be more effective as it may address moral hazard more easily. On 
the other hand, stability bonds would not be needed to reduce legacy debt because the 
implementation of the PADRE plan could address that issue and so the focus of the stability 
bonds would be to provide for financial stability at times of crisis and avoid excessive debt 
accumulations of member states, it will also provide a tool to deal with aggregate demand at 
the euro level by fostering counter cyclical fiscal policies at a supranational level, using the 
proceeds from bonds issuance to perform fiscal stimulus at an aggregate level. 
 
3.2.3 Analyzing the second alternative 
 
This second alternative recognizes as the rest of options that the current fiscal framework for 
the euro area is vulnerable. It does so by emphasizing that the ESM is not a macroeconomic 
stabilization tool and thus the EMU is not complete because it does not provide with the right 
policy mix.  
The stabilization tool presented in the form of a common fiscal capacity could be effectively 
implemented without implying a major loss of sovereignty or political challenge. The 
alternatives to this scheme: the euro area common budget or the common budget with a 
borrowing capacity are also two alternatives for establishing a common tool to provide for a 
common stabilization tool. These could be implemented and proof to be durable solutions for 
the purpose of macroeconomic stabilization. However, with regards to the implementation of 
the euro area budget the issue would be its relation with the EU budget and the political 
acceptance it would require. As well as the difficulties from allocating the investments coming 
from the common budget, again the diversity across the euro area might proof this alternative 
difficult to be accepted as public investment priorities might be very diverse. This could be 
solved by focusing the common budget on providing for financial stability but again the 
contribution system to the budget may be difficult to accept because of the EU budget. 
Secondly, with regards to a common budget with the ability to borrow and the financing of 
cross border euro area project, might be confused with the ESM because of its ability to 
borrow and again, the issue of allocating the funds for specific purposes may undermine the 
stabilization effect. This is why the mechanism proposed by the IMF might be the best out of 
the three options, if it is able to cope with moral hazard and permanent transfers (its biggest 
drawbacks), it would provide for the stabilization tool needed at the euro level. Specially if it is 
left as an automatic mechanism because the stabilization effect would be quicker and less 
controversial. 
The alternative also introduces the idea of reforming the SGP (the current fiscal framework), if 
the common fiscal capacity is applied and works as an automatic stabilizer, fiscal rules would 
have to be simple, clear and allow for flexibility at times of recession. The automatic stabilizer 
would help to support national fiscal policies so as not to excessively move away from the rule 
set, but it would be inevitable to provide for more maneuver if pro cyclical policies are to be 
avoided. 
The last measure of this alternative is the debt restructuring by the implementation of the 
PADRE plan. This requires collective action, and thus a willingness to come together and 
overcome the situation of debt accumulation in the euro area. This scheme might seem 
complex but it is an effective solution to ensure member states that all their colleagues would 
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follow the same orderly debt restructuring by establishing this common tool. The advantage is 
that it would clean the current balance accounts of member states with unsustainable debts 
and leave the euro area in a stronger situation to face future economic disruptions. 
The major advantages that can be identified in this scheme is that it provides for durable 
solutions because it takes into account the long term and the reforms would serve as a basis 
for future integration which means that the steps would be towards a stronger union. 
However, its major drawback is the lack of political will, therefore the political feasibility of the 
reforms.  
 
3.3 Towards a fiscal union 
 
The last two alternatives relied on the strengthen of fiscal coordination, maybe going one step 
further with the creation of a common budget or a common fiscal capacity, to be able to pool 
Eurozone debt and share risks. However, thinking towards the long term, coordination would 
not be enough, the Eurozone needs instruments at the supranational level. To do so, a possible 
solution would be the creation of the European unemployment insurance scheme.  
 
3.3.1 The unemployment insurance scheme 
 
The unemployment insurance scheme would be easier to apply if the common Eurozone 
budget or the common fiscal capacity already existed, this is why the second alternative 
presented in this work is useful to take steps towards more integration.  
 
The major drawback of this scheme is that labor markets across the Eurozone are very diverse. 
Specially with regards to its flexibility, as Figure 10 shows, there is no uniformity across 
member states with regards to employment protection. Although it is true that some countries 
have recognized this need and have taken actions to correct it, for example Spain has had a 
tendency towards lowering the protection, there are no common standards set, an in an 
economic and monetary union labor mobility should be incentivized. Moreover, the fact that 
labor markets differ across countries does not foster labor mobility inside the EMU.  
Employment protection is related to the costs of hiring and firing so in principle it is not 
obvious its effect on unemployment rate. In the case of the Eurozone, however, Stähler (2007) 
observed that the more protected labor markets were in Eurozone member states the higher 
was the unemployment rate (other also argue that more protections lead to higher 
unemployment duration, Blanchard and Portugal, 1998). From these observations we may 
extract that Eurozone member states should make an effort towards more flexibility of the 
labor market, because they decided to become part of a union, and therefore this implies 
converging at some point. It is important if the European unemployment insurance scheme 
were to be applied. 
 
Figure 12:  OECD Employment Protection Index 2008 for selected countries 
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Source: Bruegel 
 
Figure 13: Strictness of employment protection- individual and collective dismissals (regular 
contracts) 2000- 2013 
 
Source: Eurostat (own extraction) 
 
In the below figures unemployment rates are shown, as well as the duration of that 
unemployment. Unemployment rates are also very diverse across the Eurozone, with Spain 
being the clear winner both in terms of unemployment rate and in terms of duration. A 
common scheme like the proposed, could have been able to redistribute the effects of the 
crisis across the Eurozone. The scheme can be designed towards covering more or less 
unemployment benefits, addressing short term or long term unemployment, and depending 
on the design it would be able to address the crisis effects in one magnitude or another. For 
example, if it were to cover short term unemployment, Finland and Spain, would have 
received transfers from France, Germany and Portugal because in relative terms they had 
more unemployed workers for a 3-month period. Again, the explanation for the differences 
both in unemployment rates and duration of unemployment is because of institutional 
divergences with regards to the labor market.  
 
 
Figure 14: Unemployment by duration in selected euro area countries, 2007 and 2011 
 
Source: Bruegel 
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Figure 15: Unemployment rates across Europe (2005- 2016) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/8/8a/Unemployment_rate_2005-
2016_%28%25%29_new.png 
 
How would the scheme be designed? 
 
Unemployment is an important economic indicator, if this scheme is designed, its major 
advantage is that it would become a shock absorber with regards to short term unemployment, 
and short term unemployment is an indicator that helps to follow in which economic situation 
a country finds itself.  It is an indicator easy to understand, it is also easily measured and the 
effects of an economic downturn on the unemployment indicator are easy to foresee (Andor, 
2016). 
A basic scheme would be established to address short term unemployment. National 
unemployment schemes would be partially pooled. Eurozone taxpayers would receive the 
unemployment benefits from the common European scheme, for a period of time of around 6 
months. The benefits given by the EUI could be complemented, national authorities might 
decide to increase the duration of the benefit or the amount, it would be up to each member 
state.  
Because of the examples stated above, some minimum standards would have to be set across 
the Eurozone, the institutional gap with regards to labor markets needs to be reduced. The key 
would be to require member states to comply with some EU standards that trigger an upgrade 
in their employment services and labor market institutions. If the scheme only addresses short 
term unemployment, which implies that it would try to address cyclical unemployment, it 
would not be needed a high degree of harmonization (although in the long term it would be 
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desirable). The EUI would be financed through the contributions of employees and employers 
(who would pay to their national authorities). With this financing scheme, the unemployment 
rates fluctuations in each country would be internalized by the system, as for example if there 
is a shock Spain economy unemployment would raise and so contributions of employees 
would be reduced and the need of unemployment benefits would increase. The scheme would 
provide with the required benefits because of the shock, and once the situation of Spain is 
stabilized again, the collection from the national insurance scheme in favor of the EUI would 
increase (Andor and Pasimeni, 2016).  
The overall volume of such a scheme is considered to be around 1% of Eurozone’s GDP but 
again, this would depend on the settings that are chosen when it is designed.  
There is a risk to be addressed, politicians would not agree on a scheme that puts them in a 
situation of permanent net contributions, because there would be the risk of free riders in the 
system.  
In the graph below Spain for example would have been a net beneficiary from the scheme 
during 13 years, whereas other member states like the Netherlands or Germany would have 
been net contributors.  
Figure 16: Average yearly net contributions to the EUI, 2000- 2013 
 
Source: www.iai.it  
 
In order to avoid these imbalances there are two corrective mechanisms to be set (Andor et al, 
2014). The first one, experience rating, each member state would be monitored in order to 
check if they are net contributors to the scheme or net beneficiaries, the objective is to adjust 
at the beginning of every period the position of member states in order to achieve in the 
medium term a balanced position. The second one, claw backs, these are established to avoid 
the situation depicted in the above graph, it is a mechanism that works ex post. A member 
state like Spain, would be allowed to be a net beneficiary for several years, but after the shock 
passes or after Spain recovers from the situation it would have to compensate for the net 
transfers and so their contribution rate would increase notably.  
 
3.3.2 Blue bond proposal 
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The last proposal to consider in the present work is related to sovereign debt in the Eurozone 
through the creation of Eurobonds.  
The proposal entails dividing national sovereign debt in two:  
 A senior tranche conformed by the so called blue bonds which will amount up to 60% 
of debt to GDP. The senior status, responds to preferential payment. Blue bonds 
would be jointly guaranteed by the participating countries and so they would be rated 
as AAA assets. The Eurozone average cost of borrowing would decrease (*the cost of 
borrowing is equal to the stock of outstanding debt and the average interest rate on 
the debt stock), it would decrease because the amount of debt outstanding would be 
lower and countries with unsustainable debt levels would no longer be in that 
situation (Delpla and Weizsäcker, 2010). Thus, blue bonds would be extremely liquid 
and safe assets (comparable to the US treasury bond), the implication is that the euro 
could be raised to a position of major reserve currency which would enable euro area 
participants to borrow part of sovereign rate with interest rates comparable to the 
German bond. 
 A junior tranche conformed by the so called red bonds that would amount to all the 
debt above the 60% limit. Red bonds would increase fiscal discipline of member states; 
their existence would make the cost of borrowing would be more expensive at the 
margin. Because these bonds would be less safe than blue bonds, when a shock or a 
default occurs, the first debt affected would be the debt in the red tranche (if this debt 
is unable to absorb the shock, it would ultimately affect the blue tranche of debt).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Key factors that influence the cost of borrowing in the senior (blue) and junior (red) 
tranche 
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Source: Bruegel 
 
An issue to be handled is that of making an orderly default of debt in the red tranche credible. 
In order for this to be possible it would be necessary enhancing banking and credit rating 
agencies supervision at an EU level, also the ECB must be sensible when choosing red bonds 
for its repo facility considering the appropriate methodologies for assessing the debt (* repo 
facility: a repo is a repurchase agreement, a form of short term borrowing for dealers in 
government securities, in this case the ECB would be the party agreeing on selling the asset 
and agreeing to repurchase it in the future, usually in a day). National governments would be 
obliged to include CACs in red bond borrowings so that the debt restructuring is orderly 
performed and less long (Delpla and Weizsäcker, 2010). 
 
With this proposal the member states with highest levels of debt, such as Spain, would have 
more incentives to be more disciplined in order to have access to the scheme and be able to 
borrow at a much lower cost, this would reestablish the SGP credibility (which is of interest to 
countries like Germany). On the other hand, the countries that enjoy the most credible fiscal 
policies could be able to borrow the total of 60% of GDP (limit on level of debt established by 
the SGP) with blue bonds, if a country performs irresponsible fiscal policies repeatedly then it 
would automatically leave the system because it won’t be able to borrow with blue bonds 
(Delpla and Weizsäcker, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Split of 2011 forecast debt levels into red/ blue debt 
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Source: Bruegel 
 
Not every country would have the same proportion of debt in blue bonds, so the scheme 
would not equally beneficial for all the participants it would depend on the situation of each 
country when the scheme is implemented.  
 
How the blue bonds would be allocated? Each blue bond would be guaranteed by all the 
participant nations, by their taxpayers specifically, and the decision should be in hands of 
national parliaments so as to make the scheme legitimate. A Stability council would be created 
and it would propose an allocation for the blue bond that would have to be approved by 
national parliaments. This would provide credibility to financial markets. The mechanism 
would be guaranteed by the strongest economies in the Eurozone so member states would 
have to proof to the Independent Stability council that they comply with the necessary 
requirements to be part of the scheme and be able to borrow a determined amount with blue 
bonds. The Independent Stability council will make a proposal of blue bonds allocation and 
national parliaments would approve it or decline it, if they decline it, the country that voted 
against it would not participate in the scheme for that period. This mechanism is useful in 
order to ensure that no country borrows more than 60% of GDP in blue bonds. In order to 
avoid many member states opting out of the scheme, because the risk of leaving the scheme 
would be harming for the whole mechanism, the Stability council would have incentives to act 
in a sensible manner considering Eurozone taxpayers’ interests (Delpla and Weizsäcker, 2010). 
 
To implement this scheme, the current legacy debt (all the debt issued before the 
implementation) would be treated as senior debt with respect to red debt, but as junior debt 
with respect to blue debt. This means that the new debt issued after the scheme is 
implemented would be considered as senior debt, blue bonds, and legacy debt with respect to 
this new debt would be considered as junior. As time passes, and legacy debt is refinanced it 
would be gradually replaced by senior blue debt and junior red debt which were issued after 
the scheme was implemented. As explained before, the annual blue bond allocation would 
inform each country of how much debt is able to issue as blue bonds. In the case of the high 
indebted member states the transition period would take more time because of the need of 
more debt to be replaced (Delpla and Weizsäcker, 2010). 
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3.3.3 Analyzing the third alternative 
 
The last alternative is the most ambitious one because it requires structural reforms to 
implement the stabilization mechanism and on the other hand it envisages a system of dealing 
with legacy debt and at the same time being able to jointly issue bonds at a euro area level.  
The first measure, the unemployment insurance scheme would provide for the 
macroeconomic stabilization that the euro zone needs. The unemployment scheme would 
allow to absorb country specific shocks effectively it would also allow for discretion for 
member states, meaning that they would be able to complement it however they wanted. It 
would not imply more than a 1% of the euro zone total GDP which is not a large amount 
(although it would depend on its settings when it is designed). Aside from offering 
macroeconomic stabilization it would also provide for social protection objectives, as well as 
being a risk sharing mechanism. On the other hand, the proposal of euro bonds would allow 
the Eurozone to deal with legacy debt and at the same time be able to jointly issue bonds. This 
would provide more stability as it would decrease the likeness that euro area member states 
loose access to market in the context of a recession and at the same time it would enhance 
fiscal discipline. These to measures would be effective as long as they provide the right 
incentives and above all correctly address the fear from several member states (especially 
northern countries) of permanent transfers. 
The scheme presented in the last alternative would be the culmination of a fiscal integration, 
which means that it would be durable and able to overcome a future crisis, however the major 
drawback is the reforms it would require, specially for the unemployment insurance scheme. 
Labor markets should eventually converge but it is not likely to happen in a near future, and a 
scheme like this could not be implemented without effective convergence. Political acceptance 
would not be easy to acquire with regards to labor markets or to the collective emission of 
bonds. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
After researching about the current situation of the economic and monetary union of the EU 
and after gaining knowledge about the possible solutions to address the fiscal pillar of the 
EMU I believe that the only way forward for the euro area is to take steps together towards 
stronger cooperation and eventually complete integration. 
The EMU was built as a common project, a solidarity project with the aim of converting the 
European economy in a global leader. The project has not failed, at least for the moment, but 
it has not succeeded either. The reason lies on its design failures. I believe that the design 
failures are mainly related to political resistance which have represented a barrier for the 
integration of the EU since the very beginning. It makes sense though, because the EU 
represents the unification of a set of sovereign states with their own defined identity, the EU is 
rich in diversity and the national fears for a possible loss of either identity or sovereign power 
are greater than the possible willingness to further integrate with the European colleagues. 
However, the countries that accepted being part of this project have also been able to 
recognize the benefits it brings to their economic growth and development, countries have 
experienced a raise in their economic relevance in a global perspective because of their EU 
membership. The benefits are not only related to economic consequences but also social, the 
facilities that European citizens have nowadays could have not been foreseen thirty years ago. 
This is why I believe that it would not make any sense to reverse a process once it has already 
started. It would imply giving up, and no one said that the EMU would be easy to construct or 
that the European project would be built from one day to another. The current French Leader 
Macron already said that if people do not believe in the EU or in the euro it should be 
dismantled. This is what the EU currently lacks of, it lacks of credibility, support, willingness to 
move forward, and a common identity, because if this is not achieved the future of the EU is 
very uncertain.  
All the alternatives presented in this work require a degree of political acceptance, in a minor 
or major degree but it is a perquisite to move forward. EU institutions have already expressed 
the urgency of completing the EMU. The IMF has also expressed this urgency and has even 
presented proposals to support the EU institutions in the measures to fix deadlines and action 
plans. Political leaders across the EU have also expressed their concerns because the fear that 
without any reform their economies would not be able to recover, and above all the common 
currency, the euro, might disappear. 
Thus, there is common consensus on the need to take the necessary measures to ensure that 
the EMU becomes the global economic leader it was intended to be when it was first 
envisaged. Much has been achieved since then, which means that much can be still achieved. 
The fact that the EU has realized of the need of completing its current institutional 
organization because of the crisis does not imply that it is unable to correct the past errors. If 
the crisis has helped to recognize those defaults, then the EU should take a strong and 
determined position to readdress these defaults and strengthen the EMU toolkit. Instead of 
focusing on the tensions rising among member states and on culpability accusations, the EU 
should foster cooperation to take collective action and leave the past behind because it does 
not lead to any solution.  
The alternatives presented could be regarded as a step by step approach. Some measures are 
easier to implement because they do not imply a political challenge because they do not 
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require major reforms nor a need for strong convergence. However, the EU should be 
ambitious. It should bear in mind the mistakes that have driven it to the after crisis situation, it 
has to be realistic too and be able to recognize and admit the divergences across the member 
states.  
In my opinion the best option for the euro area, would be to start setting the base for future 
integration. The long term objective should be convergence, with regards to competitiveness, 
productivity and labor markets. Thus being able to converge in relation to business cycles. 
Nevertheless, this is not completely feasible in the present because of the lack of political will, 
thus, the focus should be establishing the proper tools to allow for a future of further 
convergence. The establishment of either a common fiscal capacity or a common euro area 
budget would serve as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. It would be easier to accept in 
political terms because although it implies risk sharing among member states, they have 
already realized that the euro area requires a common mechanism because their 
interconnection already generates externalities from country to country depending on the 
fiscal policies established; but they do not have a mechanism to deal with these externalities 
or with country specific shocks. Moreover, the current fiscal rules do not support counter 
cyclical policies, which has led to a deeper recession in some countries. And at the bigger 
picture, the ECB with its monetary policy has been unable to address the situation because it is 
in charge of maintaining price stability at the euro area but it cannot consider the needs of 
individual member states. The ESM has been a patch during the crisis that has helped some 
member states that had lost access to market to obtain an alternative source of financing, but 
it is not a definite solution as it is a lending capacity unable of providing macroeconomic 
stabilization at the euro area level.  
A mechanism like the common fiscal capacity would complement the monetary policy by the 
ECB because of the provision of macroeconomic stabilization both at the greatest level and in 
country specific terms. Although the mechanism will only succeed if it provides the right 
benefits for all the participants, which means that all of them have to be willing to participate 
because they would gain with the creation of this scheme. Concerns such as permanent 
transfers and moral hazard problems would be eliminated with the correct measures. The 
mechanism would work automatically to avoid controversies. And it would be the base for 
further future integration, like the possibility of creating a European Treasury.  
I believe that, if properly presented, the common fiscal capacity would not be as difficult to 
accept as other options requiring more political acceptance.  
However, it won’t be enough because of the different levels of accumulated debt across the 
euro area members. This generates a source of vulnerability for the whole area as they share 
the same currency so the actions by one-member state or its economic situation have 
repercussions on the rest. This is something they accepted at the time they adopted the euro 
as their currency. This is why debt restructuring is necessary. Ideally I would say the best 
option would be either to follow the PADRE plan which implies a collective action or even 
more ambitious, to follow the blue bond proposal. The blue blond proposal has a twofold 
advantage which is providing for a debt restructuring tool whilst providing for a risk sharing 
mechanism that would increase discipline, enforcement of fiscal rules and the access to 
financial markets for member states. It would be politically difficult to accept, specially for the 
northern countries of the euro zone but the advantages to be obtained are greater than the 
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costs. This is why a first approach by applying the PADRE plan may set the proper grounds for a 
future Eurobond.  
To start with the integration process and eventually deeper convergence, EU institutions 
should compromise on specific measures establish a deadline for these to be implemented 
and start to work because there is no time to waste. I would point out that for this process to 
succeed and have the legitimacy that worries national governments across the euro area, the 
construction and strengthening of the European identity cannot be forgotten. Future 
generations need to believe in this project, willingness to complete it is essential for its survival 
and success, and thus it is EU institutions and national governments responsibility to not forget 
that European citizens are the basis of this project and they need to believe in it and be 
reminded of what it makes it a project worth fighting for.   
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